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TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
MAGISTRATE DMSION
In the Matter of the Estate or

)

MELVIN PETER.SON.

)
)
)

Deceased.

CASE NO. CV-2007-00266

CATHIE PETERSON'S
RESPONSIVE BRIEF

)

COMES NOW BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, FEATHERSTON LAW "FIRM, CHT.O.,
attorneys for C.athie Peterson. individually, and hereby submits the foltowins responsive brief

L

STAT.£ OF FACTS
This case nrises from the State of Idaho, .Department of Health and Welfare's.,

("Ocpartmentj claim for Medicaid rcimbmsemenl asserted against the Estate of Melvin

Peterson.
On Decembers. 20011, by deed, Mr. Peterson conveyed his home to Cathie Peterson
retaining a life estate to himself.. At the time, Cathie Peterson resided in the home and was
caregivt?r for her :fu.thcr. Catllie Peterson expended several thousand dollm:s in making
improvcmcn~ to her -very modest home from

December, 2001, until the Department asserted a

claim to the property in this proceeding.

Melvin Peter.son began recei'Ving Medicaid benefils several years after deeding the

home to Ms. Peterson.
l..1;.11.."'-~~•

•fii...i;o,t1111.Uilli.t/t.~
f'(JIJ.fllli.~

;f',;.r,('J¥Ml.l.ilti."f,.Oll
·~.....ti~

J,/Mkl <!"'11.\Nril'lfl1•1f
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Upon Mr. Peterson's death on March 3, 2007, the Court appointed Ms. Cathie Peterson
as Personal Representative of the Estate. Ms. Peterson filed an inventory of the Melvin
Peterson Estate. Subsequently. upon the Court's Order to do so, Ms. Peterson included in lhe
inventory ofthe Estaie of Melvin Peterson, the ..life ~late" at a ZL'TO value.
The Department objected to the valuation. 1n response, Cathie Peterson) as Personal
Representative of the Estate, filed a Motion to Hire Appraiser to dr:terminc the value ofthe life
estate.

Surprisingly, the LA..Jl8tlment objected to the Personal Rcprcscnlative, Cathie

Peterson· s, Motion to Hire Appraiser slating that 1.he proposed appraiser was not ..qualified to
provide such opinion evidence because he is not an actuary or a person otherwise possessed
with specialized knowledge of life expectancies". The State further alleged in thcir objection
that they would only agree to the appointment of an appr-aiser to determine fair market value of
the fee ownership of the property so as to apply the "life estate table contained in. I.D.A.P.A §
16.03.05.837.02 .•. in order to properly dctt..'Tt'nine the actual value of the life cstalc interest."
The Department's objection further stated that the cost of such appraisal should not be
home by the Estate., but rather by the Personal Representative, individually.
The Department ha..; been intent on using the LD.A.P.A. Table from the beginning,

refusing to permit a qualified opinion of value.
Cathie Peterson has
individual capacity.

~

been joined in. this action as an individual or in her

She specially appc:arcd through the undersigned counsel reserving

jurisdiction and service ofprocess after it became clear that the State ofidaho intended to force
~ .lliir :firm""
!Dlfrlkf!l'. :r~

lll1'111 r:. ;r<#lfim1.in•
Jtmlt9!1'. :rtiirkr.trim
>l~•rLlllOI

U.f.1..it«....01....,
~"'· ,1,1a.1u~
(llr¥}~

:t1tc.¢rJITJ .lf1"1"1f00

the sale ofher residence and home based upon I.D.A.P.A. 16.03 .05.837 {Rule 837).
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On July 15, 2009. the Department filed a Petition to Compel Sale of Home and to
Compel Payment to the Department of i~ cla:im. 1

The Court's Order granting the

Department's Petition to Compel Sale of Home was overturned on appeal. On remand. the
Court removed Ms. Cathie Peterson as Personal Representative of the Estate of Melvin

Peterson and appointed the State of Idaho,. Department of Health and Welfme, as Successor

Personal Represenhltivc:.
At hearing on September 29~ 2011. the State of Idaho as Successor Personal

Representative brought before the Court a Petition for Entry of Findings of Fact and
Conclw,ions of Law. The Department presented no evidence as to the value of the real

property or life estate in question.
The Department asserts Omt the Court should make a ~g"' as to the percentage or
value attributnbJe to Mr. Melvin Pctcrson"s life estate at the time ofhls death based upon Rule
837 and upon Idaho Code§ S6·218(4)(b)(201 l).
For the reasons discussed below, neither provisions arc applicable aod the Court should
d~y the State of Idaho's Petition for EntJ:y of F"indings of Fact and Conclmiions of Law in their

totality.

Il.

ARGUMENT
A.

Rule 837 is inapplicable.

The State ofldaho 8fbY\les that LO.AP A 16.03.0S entitled Rules Govcming Eligioility
for Aid to the Aged. .Blind and Disnbled dictates the Court~s ruling in valuing Mr. Peterson's
~ .J:.m; 7frm dill

..,,.,'
J'.
!/ltr.nrC..,.r#lf'ir.rli.m•

1tmflmliltt

~rmy lP. j"t11tlitt,tim
"'"'''""" ,, .GllW
n.1.f,,t:.""'4</J?J.1M,

~~""i't""'· l~,l,'l;lfd
PIJ#J!Jt:.~

:fl..(P,l/f)~'hf>f<lll

.,,__,,,
Jlfoh.> ......,,.IM'kfltldff

1

The Petition to Compel the Home at that time owned in fee simple was never served on or
brought us an independent action against Cathie Peterson., an individual. Cathie Peterson has
participated. ns an individual in this matter pursuant only to a special appearance reserving
jurisdiction., venue, service ofprocess and due process filed September 17, 2010.

NOV-18-20ll(FRI) 17: 19
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II

lifo estate at the time of his death. ·111c fundamental issue of whether a life est.ale hus v-,llue at

the time of death is a matter of common law principles and will be discussed further below.

Rule 837 reads in pertinent part as follows:
RULE 837 - LTFE ESTATE AS ASSET TilANSFER.
.01. Tnm.od'er of n Remainder Interest When a
life estate in real property is retained by an individual,
and a remainder interest in the property is transferred
during the look b!lck period for less than the fu.ir market
value of the remainder inter=,'t transf~ the value of
the uncompensated remainder is subject 10 the assert
transfer penalty as described in Sections 831 through
835 of these rules. To compute the value of the lifu
eslate remainder, multiply the fair market value of the
real property at the time of transfer by the remainder
fuctor for the participanes age at the time of transfer
l.isted in the: following table:

T.D.A.P.A. 16.03.05.837
runderline added]
A simple reading of Rule 837 above makes clear that the rule was adopted for

application in assessing a value to a lifu estate in determining a recipienCs a...::..-:et transfer
penalty "during the look back period" during their lifetime. By its very definition above, the
rule and the remainder table is used and onl)! applied during the lifetime of an applicant for
b<.."nefits to detennine an appropriate asset transfer pcnalty.1
At no time docs the State of Idaho ever explain their debire to apply a Rule 837 under
these circumstances. "TI1c value of the life estate is deter.mined by a formula which talccs into
account the age and life expectancy oft.he life tenant. The longer the life expectancy of the life
~ J:4w :Firm""'
'./Janlt!iP.1t11rJiaJ/11n

!/lrmtC.:1'11~·

J~:t'.:rot~·
Aniilll•JUt"'"'I

w•.;..........,,14.,,..,

2

Ac:set transfer penalties are assessed pursuant to Rules 831 through 836 to Medicaid
participan1s in long term care or H.C.B.S. Sec T.D.A.P.A. 16.03.05.831.

,)\;~JIM!..11:...,.,.,

,:;tfltJ~#
:r.q:(ll06).'I~

CA"l11IE PETERSON'S RESl*ONSIVE DRllCI<' • .c

Fe,·· rston Law Firm Chtd.
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tenant, the greater is the value of the life estate". West v. Tax Commission. 99 Tdaho 26, 27,
576P.2d1060, 1061 (1978).

The process of determining an asset t:ranstbr penalty during the lifetime of the Medicaid
participant certainly involves actuarial determinations, however, the valuation of a Hle estute, at
the time of a

m~+uring

life's death, no longer logically involves those same actuarial

detc:nninations. The decedent has died. There is no further accounting for age or life

expectancy,
The Idaho Probate Code requires on1y that a Personal Rcprcscncative prepare an
inventory of property "owned by the decedent at the time of his death". Idaho Code§ IS-3706. It docs .not require a detenninution of assets owned prior to the death of the decedent or
up to the dnt.e of death~ but only those 3$Ct.s at the lime of his death.

Only property which the decedent owned at the time ofhis death is subject to inventory
and appraisement under LC.§ IS-3-106. Since the life estate terminated at Melvin Peterson's
death. there is no asset to value and use of Rule 837 to set such a value is improper. by the
plain terms of the Ruic and by simple logic.
B.

Idaho Code§ 56-218 does not apply in tbc<Cc circumd.a.necs.

The Stute ofIdaho argues in their closing briefthat I.C. § 56-218(4)(b) defines an ~'tate
that is subject to Medicaid recovery. Although not expressly stated, it appears that the

Department's position is that this definition of estate assets overrides the common Jaw or
Probate Code.
~ .uzw ~ t»<
~ll'.

For the rcaso.llS set forth below~ the plain terms and language of Idaho Code § 56-218

,-11111imtdn

~i;.~=::

docs not require Ille inclusion ofthe life estate reserved by Melvin Peterson in 2001.

~llt~
11.•.!J.~~ ...

,:Mi;.{J"'f~t• .1. .JllOl'J~
;1lil!;ll!QI) MJ.ofl'JIJ

·~

...

~,.

ff(,;./i,>O'~l'Wll"I

l\ l 0
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For purposes of this section, the term ••estate•; shall include:
(a)
(b)

all real and personal property and other assets included
within the individual~s estate, as defined for pwposes of
~tale probate law; and
any other real and personal property and other assets in
which the individual had any lesfil title or interest at the
tjme of dcalh, to the extent or suchJntere!tj:, including
such assets t'tl!.~£!! to a survivor, heir or ~ib'Tl of the
deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in
common, survivorsbip, life cst:atc, living trust or other

ammgement.
LC. § 56-218(4)(2011)
(cmpha.5is added]
The statute docs not state that a decedent's life estute is to be included in his estate for

Medicaid recovery.

In~i:eac4 the statute

refers to life estates conveyed to a survivor.

For example, Mr. Peterson could have conveyed his property to his daughter in fee titl~

for his lifetime. That conveyance is a life cst:atc and may revert or transfer to a remainder at the
time of Mr. Peterson's death. At his death, U1is interest is subject to Medicaid recovery under

subsection (b).
Jn th.is instance, Mr. Pel.t."l'Son did not convey a life CS1atc interest to Ms. Peterson
before his death. Tfhe had. that interest would be subject to estate recovery in !he ~1ate. Mr.
Peterson conveyed a remainder interest subject to his own reserved life estate. For that reason,
the latter portion of the statute quoted above is not applicable. The Court should decline to
make any findings of fact or conclw.ions oflaw applying Idaho Code § 56-218.

~ .t:Rw 71rm a.(
'.f;liinft{It'. :Jf.illfimll'll
!llfl!.#tC.fAt/ier.,~

Jtmrt!fll'. :Tr#llit:r/loll
AllPr!lll;ll"~I"""

LZ.7 I· """'""
"'""'
,f.<Wf"'11r,
L~illidlUH'I
piQ#J.;T~
A~PfJIJ;j"""Hf'•

'-lll
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Idaho Code § 56-218 docs not require tbe inclusion of a life cstute
a.q un asset for purposes of Medicaid recovery.

Idaho Code § 56-218(4)(a) provides .that the term estate shall include all real and
personal property and other assets included wilhin lhe individual's estate as defined for
purposes

or state probate law·'. I.C. § S6-218(4Xa)(2011).

The Idaho Probate Code imposes a duty upon the personal representative to inventory
and appraise: all "property owned by the decedent at the time of his death, listing it with

reasonable detail. and indicating as to each listed item its fuir market value as of the date of the

decedent's death". LC.§ 15-3-706 (2011).
Idaho Code § 15-1-201(16) defines an "eb'Ulle" as "all property of the decedent,
including communizy propeey of the surviving spouse, subject to administxation, property or
trusts. and property of any other person whose affuin: are !>'Ubjr:ct to this code as .it exists from

time to time: during administration". Idaho Code§ IS-1-201(16)(2011).
"A lite estate is an in1~1 in rcul property, the duration of which is limited by the life
of some person." Tobias v. State Tax Commission., 85 Idaho 250, 25S, 378 P.2d 628, _
( 1963); quoting Thompson on Rc:al Property, Volume IT, § 780.
"It is important to ~ however, that if the deceased owned a life estate during his
or her ur~ lhe life e!.'1at.e

wm terminate upon death and will not be part of the estate.."

AmJur. -Proof ofl"acts 3d, 101 (2011).

~ .(Jzw :f/rmrstt
!flaltit{JI'. !ftJllMIJllm
l,111r11rr: :r~·
Jtmnglt~,.~
JllllffflrJP<lt/.<i"'

"....,·"-'""(./
.....,
'"""-1<.-

,;.,i;,r}'f'W.

~l:U..•.UU

:l•it:.f!Ull'J.U.•-

•,r.,ce,,1..rm
UmiP ct' 'tt\Wil'Wf<'H

Fee simple absolute title by a grantor can be split during the
conveyance into a present estate: and a future estate. The most
comm.on present cmate is fhe life es1ate. The creation of the life
estate usually involves words indicating that the possession is
for life or some similar limitation •••• without .laoguage giving
fhe lire t:!.iate owner the right to dispose of the property, the
future interest cannot be conveyed by the life estate owner .••••
there arc two types of future estates associated with the life

121

Fee'
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estate. These arc the reversion and the remainder •••. A
remainder is used when the grantor wants to convey ownership
of the future interest to a third party.

The Court pn.'"Vio1.JSly ordered the Personal Representative to include the life estate as

an asset on the inventory. That was done and the life estate was valued by the fonner Personal
Representative at zero value. As ofthis elate. the Court has heard no testimony or evidence that
would indicate that the life estate has any value at the time of Mr. Peterson's death or that it is
to be included by either Idaho Probate Code or under common law principles within the estate
to be probated.

The Department's claim relies entirely upon the Medicaid Rccovc:r:y Act found in Idaho

Code § 56-218. However, the Department's i.nterpretation of LC. § 56-218 is not consistent
with the aciual language of Idaho Code § 56-218. The statute defers to Probate Code for a

determination ofwhat interests are to be included.
For the n:asons set forth herein, the Court wouJd commit error to assess any value to
the life estate. as such a determination would be contrary to law. Indeed, lhe Jife estate should
not have been included in the estate inventory. Tt was properly appraised at no value by Ms.

Peterson, as former Personal Representative.
C.

Tiais CoJJrt lack." subject: matter iurisdiction to determine the issues befor.~
it.

"It is the general rule that where title to real property is an issue between an estate and

its heirs and a tJ1ird person, such issue must be tried in an independent action brought for that
~ .triw 1'lmc""
lfJrtrtlef!l'.~n

:limit c. :r"''~~,,,.

.

:fmllty:t. :Jmkr.111ffl
J1llllff1KJl'tltUW
'U.$.~"....
.:l#twlJ'f'lllf. lll'llllfl ,,._...,,..
~Ii#~

:t1ntf.llilf):w..J"""11J

purpose in a competent tribunal and cannot be tried by the probate court." In re lrundj(s

Estate. 79 Idaho 185, 193. 312 P.2d 1028, 1032 (1957).
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II

The State of Idaho seeks a court finding that they have a percentage interest based upon
the asset transfer tables

set

forth in Rule 837. This finding is beyond the subject matter

jurisdiction of the probate court. A...; indicated all along. Ms. Peterson is appearing only
through a special appearance reserving jurisdiction, both pt..'"t'SOnal and subject matter, and this

Court should decline to make or enter findings of fact and conclusions of law where the State
ofTdaho has failed to establish subject matter for pt."l'SOnal jurisdiction.

m.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the evidence in the record, the Court is asked to make the following

findings of fact and conclUbions of law:
I.

Melvin Peterson conveyed fee title ownership to Calhie Pelerson in certain. real

property on Oeccmber S, 2001, rcserviog to himself a life estate.
2.

Cathie Peterson, in reliance upon the deed, and us an occupant and possessor of

said real propc:rty during Melvin Peterson's lifetime, made certain improvements and incurred.
expenses for the improvement ort.he real property, as her ~idence, totaling ~cm.I thousand

dollars.
3.

Several years later, Melvin Peterson applied for and received Medicrud benefits

through the State ofJdaho, Department of Health and Welfare.
4.
at the

The State of Idaho, Oi:partmcnt of Health and Welfiu'c, apparently determined

time of Melvin Peterson's application that no asset transfer penalty should be imposed

on the basis of Melvin Peterson's t'etnined life estate.
!ffat/#t:tm .J:m; :;,,.,,, l'Sttl
1'ilttft(lt'. !Tmfimllffl
:lltmC:~lllfr"
~fllttlimllffl

,_,,!Po

s.

Melvin Peterson died March 3, 2007, and was 83 years ofage.

6.

At the time of Melvin Peterson's death, his life estate terminated by operation

A~11t~

of law and at that date of death, Melvin Peterson held no legal interest in the real property.
l.1/1,!f.,...........""...

•f.i!Hi'"f"'' lllN/l.HU
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The State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, filed a .claim for

Medicaid benefits of$171,386.94.
8.

Tbe State of ldaho ~provided an opportunity at trial on September 29, 2011,

to introduce evidence of a proper valuation of the life eb"l:ale of Melvin Peterson at the time of
his death and i.ntroduced no such evidence.

9.

By operation of law, the life Cb1utc of Melvin Peterson ceased to exist at the

time of his death and~ therefore, had no value.
10.

The Court finds that the asset tranbfer penalty provisions applied to life estate

and remainder intercsm under Rule 837 arc inapplicable to the circumstances of valuing a life
estate at the time of death.

11.

The Court further finds that the provisions of Rule 837, ct seq. are specifically

restricted to detr:nnining an appropriate value during the life of a Medicaid bencficiw:y for
purposes of imposing an asset transfer penalty and is, therefore, inapplicable for pwposes of
determining a life eb1nte value at the time of death.

12.

1bc State of Idaho, having failed to provide any evidence as to the vulue of the

life esinte, lhis Court finds that· no such value or interest can be attributed to the State of Idaho
in and to that real property conveyed by Warranty Deed from Melvin Peterson to Cathie

Peterson on December S, 2001.
13.

1bc State of Idaho, Department

or Heulth and Weltare, is not entitled to any

lien or interest attributable to the life estate at issue in this matter.
14.

Further, the Court linds that Cuthic Peterson was not properly made a party to

this proceeding by service of process or other appropriate due process that would vest this
J.J.;J.f••fll-.f"""""

Court with personal jurisdiction over Cathie Peterson and/or the real property at issue.

.JollHl~I. ''i;lj,l~u.;,/
(110ll)$1i.~
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Further, the Magistrate Court. acting as Probate Court in these proceedings,

lac~ subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to

16.

(FRXPn

rston Law Firm Chtd.

Idaho Juw.

Finally, the Court. acting in equity. finds that Cathie Peterson equitably relied

upon the Warranty Deed dated December 5, 2001,. and inclllTed expenses, improving the real
property in reliance upon the deed from Melvin Peterson totaling several thousand dollars.
17.

The Court furthi:r finds that the Department failed to file or perfect any proper

Hen or other encumbrance which would provide actual or constructive notice to Cathie

Pctc!son of the interests claimed by the State ofTdaho, Department of Health and Welfare. A-:

such, the Court finds that it would be .inequitable for the Court to impose a lien or assess an
interest in the real property to or in fuvor of the State of Idaho, Department of HcaJth and
Welfure.

;Cr

DATED this~ day ofNovcmber, 2011.

RENT C. FEATHERSTON
Attorney for Cathie Peterson
Individually
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
In the Matter of the Estate of
MELVIN PETERSON,
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2007-266
REPLY BRIEF

_____________________________)
COMES NOW the State ofldaho, Department of Health and Welfare, a claimant and
successor personal representative herein (hereinai."'ter, the "Department"), and submits the
following reply to "Cathie Peterson's Responsive Brief:"
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I.
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE LIFE ESTATE IS AN
ASSET OF THE ESTATE HAS ALREADY BEEN DECIDED.
A.
The Endlessly Repeated Argument That the Life Estate Is Not an Asset of the Estate
Should Be Ignored.

Cathie Peterson argues, yet again, that contrary to the plain language of Idaho Code § 56218(4)(b), the life estate has no value. This question was decided by the court more than three
years ago. The Order on Petition to Require Payment of Claim (June 12, 2008) established the
life estate as an asset of the estate, and required Cathie Peterson, then personal representative, to
include the life estate in the inventory and assign it an appropriate value. Her failure and refusal
to assign the life estate an appropriate non-zero value was part of grounds for her removal as
personal representative. Tr. (Oct. 7, 2010) p. 33, II. 11-17. Her removal was upheld on appeal by
the District Court, and therefore, this is now the law of this case. Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705,
709, 201P.3d1282, 1286 (2009). At some point Peterson's endless rehashing of this long
decided issue must end.

B.

Cathie Peterson's New Interpretation ofldaho Code§ 56-218(4)(b) Is Absurd.
Peterson, for the first time, advances a new and novel reading of the expanded definition

of estate found in Idaho Code§ 56-218(4)(b). She contends that it would only apply if Melvin
Peterson had given a life estate to Cathie Peterson, rather than retained a life estate for himself.
This is absurd because the reversionary interest would already be an asset of the estate under
section (4)(a), and the expanded definition of estate in section (4)(b), which includes life estates,
would be totally unnecessary. This construction is also contrary to every case that has construed
the expanded definition of estate, including State Dept. ofHuman Services v. Willingham, 206
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Or.App. 156, 136 P.3d 66 (2006), Banta v. Burke, 98 Cal.App.4th 788, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 72
(2002), and In re Estate ofLaughead, 696 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa 2005), as well as Judge Gaskill's
decision in the case of In re Estate ofGrothe, Nez Perce County No. CV 02-02163. Peterson has
cited no authority that would support her construction of the statute and there is none.

II.
THERE IS NO REASON RULE 837 SHOULD NOT APPLY
TO THIS CASE.
Peterson argues that the life estate tables in Rule 83 7 should not be used because the
tables should be applied only during the lifetime of the Medicaid recipient. That argument is not
based on any specific language in the rule and does not make sense. The life estate must be
valued immediately before death. As explained in In re Estate ofLaughead, supra:
Whether Ruby, "at the time of her death," had an interest in the real property at
issue here is determined as of a point in time immediately before her death. See In
re Barkema Trust, 690 N.W.2d 50, 56 (Iowa 2004) (holding ''the phrase 'at the
time of death' means the time immediately before the Medicaid recipient's
death"). Immediately prior to her death, Ruby held a life estate in 338 acres of
land. For reasons that follow, we hold her life estate constituted an interest in real
property within the meaning of section 249A.5(2)(c ).

In re Estate ofLaughead, 696 N. W.2d at 316. Had Melvin Peterson signed a quit-claim deed
immediately before his death, ceding his life estate interest to Cathie Peterson, the tables found in
Rule 83 7 would obviously be applied. It makes no sense to say that some other measure should
be used a few moments later after Melvin Peterson had expired.
Peterson, for her part, offered no other basis for valuing the life estate, other than to again
argue that there should be no value at all, in essence inviting the court to ignore section (4)(b)
entirely. This is not a reasonable alternative. In her statement of facts, Peterson implies that the
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appraiser hired to determine the value of the property would have found the life estate to be
worth nothing. However, this argument was previously rejected by the court and is disingenuous.
The fact that there may be no market for a minority interest in property does not mean that the
minority interest has no value. That is why the partition statutes exist. See Chapter 5, Title 6,
Idaho Code. Having failed to offer any reasonable alternative valuation of the life estate,
Peterson should not be permitted to simply object to the reasonable and obvious application of
the life estate tables in Rule 83 7.

III.
THERE IS NO JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE
Also, yet again, Cathie Peterson challenges the court's subject matter and personal
jurisdiction. The arguments in this regard have taken on the character of the arguments related to
how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. The reality is there is no jurisdictional issue
here.
Idaho Code § 1-2208(2) assigns probate and estate administration cases to the
magistrates. This is so irrespective of the value of the estate or its assets. Keeven vs. Estate of
Keevan, 126 Idaho 290, 882 P.2d 457 (App. 1994). Idaho Code§ 15-3-104 gives exclusive
jurisdiction to this court to determine claims against the decedent and his successors:
No proceeding to enforce a claim against the estate of a decedent or his successors
may be revived or commenced before the appointment of a personal
representative. After the appointment and until distribution, all proceedings and
actions to enforce a claim against the estate are governed by the procedure
prescribed by this chapter.

***
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Idaho Code § 15-3-104 (underline added). Cathie Peterson is, very clearly, a successor to Melvin
Peterson, as well as an heir. She is Melvin Peterson's daughter and the ordinary successor to the
remainder interest in the life estate.
Cathie Peterson wants it both ways. She wants to be treated as a party while she is
personal representative and has control of the assets of the estate, but she wants to be treated as a
third party when she doesn't like the outcome. She cites the case of In re Lundy 's Estate, 79
Idaho 185, 312 P.2d 1028 (1957) for the proposition that a separate action is necessary to
determine the property rights of a third party. While this may be so, she is not a third party. She
sought appointment as personal representative of the estate as "the daughter" and one of two
"sole surviving issue and heirs at law of the decedent." Application for Informal Probate and
Appointment ofa Personal Representative (July 26, 2007). When Cathie Peterson was removed
as personal representative, the court retained jurisdiction over her. Order Removing Personal
Representative (October 7, 2010). This order was the subject of an appeal to the District Court
and was upheld on appeal. Cathie Peterson was given notice of the hearing in which she
participated. Idaho Code§ 15-3-106 states:
Subject to general rules concerning the proper location of civil litigation and
jurisdiction of persons, the court may herein determine any other controversy
concerning a succession or to which an estate, through a personal representative,
may be a party. Persons notified are bound though less than all interested persons
may have been given notice.
Idaho Code§ 15-3-106 (underline added). Cathie Peterson appeared at the evidentiary hearing,
participated, and offered her own evidence. It cannot be more clear that the court has jurisdiction
to determine the property rights between the Department and Cathie Peterson relating to the
assets of this estate, including the life estate.
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Finally, the underlying hearing was held at the insistence of the District Court, and was
for the benefit of Cathie Peterson, to permit her to present such evidence and arguments as she
thought necessary. Tue personal representative could simply have assigned the value of the life
estate and proceeded to bring a partition action in the District Court. It seems odd that Cathie
Peterson would object to the jurisdiction of the court to determine issues presented at a hearing
held for her own benefit.
DATED this 30th day ofNovember, 2011,

Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed,
postage pre-paid, to the following:
Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd.
Attorneys at Law
113 South Second A venue
Sandpoint, ID 83864
John A. Finney
Finney Finney & Finney, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
Old Power House Building
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint ID 83864
DATED this_!;;{)_ day ofNovember, 2011.

J?_bmf.?U~

LISA M. WARREN, Paralegal
Contracts and Administrative Law Division
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W. Corey Cartwright
Deputy Attorney General
3276 Elder, Ste. B
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83 720 .. 0009
ATTORNEY FOR STATE OF IDAHO, DEPT. OF HEALTH AND WELFARE AND PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE

John A. Finney
FINNEY, FTh.1NEY, & FINNEY, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
120 E. Lake St., Ste. 317
Sandpomt, CD 83 864
ATTORNEYS FOR CATHIE PETERSON AS FORMER PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
Brent C. Featherston
Attorney at Law
113 South Second A venue
Sandpoint, ID 838674. ,,
ATTORNEY FOR CATHIE PETERSON, INDIVIDUALLY BY SPECIAL APPEARANCE

I.
INTRODUCTION
·At issue in this case is the State ofldaho, Department of Health and Welfare's ability to
enforce its statutory lien for Medicaid expenditures against real property currently owned by the
decedent's daughter Cathie Peterson. FolJowing a remand by the district court for additional
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and an intervening appeal stemming from this court's
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removal of Ms. Peterson as the personal representative, an evidentiary hearing was conducted on
September 29, 2011. The parties have submitted their post-trial briefs, and the matter is now
deemed ripe for the court's determination.

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Melvin Peterson was born on

nd died on March 3, 2007 at the age of 83.

Cathie Peterson is Melvin's adult daughter, and was the personal representative in this probate
proceeding until being removed by the court following hearing on the State's petition for removal
on October 7, 2010.
The vast majority of the facts in this case are not in dispute. On December 6, 2001, Melvin
gifted ownership of his residential real property to Cathie, reserving to himself a life estate. Cathie
did not pay fair market value for the remainder interest she received. The deed at issue is
appropriately titled "Gift Deed", and was recorded as instrument #204218 in Boundary County.
According to the State's amended claim, Melvin began receiving Medicaid benefits on or
about March of2003. By the time of his death, Melvin had received a total of $171,386.94 in
Medicaid benefits. At the hearing on the State's petition for allowance of its claim against the
estate, the personal representative Cathie Peterson agreed that the State's Medicaid claim was valid
and should be allowed by the court. The court entered an order allowing the State's claim on April
14, 2008.
In May of2008, the State petitioned the court for its order requiring payment of its claim by
sale of the real property and residence to which Melvin retained a life estate at the time of his death.
As the current titled owner of that real property, Cathie objected on a variety of grounds, which
were rejected by the court due to its stated reliance on the reasoning and conclusions set forth by

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Page 2of8

Judge Gaskill in his "Grothe Estate" decisions in Nez Perce County. A copy of those decisions had
been provided to the court and Cathie Peterson's counsel John Finney by the State's former counsel
Larry Goins. This court clearly recollects discussion with the parties on the record concerning Judge
Gaskill's persuasive reasoning and conclusions in the Grothe probate, and its announcement that
said reasoning was being adopted by the court in this case.
However, for reasons that remain unclear, none of that discussion appears in the transcripts ·
that were provided to the district court on appeal. Consequently, the district court was unable to
ascertain this court's rationale for its conclusion that a portion of the real property currently owned
by Cathie Peterson is subject to the State's Medicaid reimbursement lien. It is aiso noteworthy that
the State's current counsel, Mr. Cartwright, has advised that the State is no longer maintaining its
former position that this court can require the sale of Cathie Peterson's real property as an estate
asset to satisfy its claim. Instead, the State now concedes that this court can only recognize and
quantify the lien, and the State will then need to file an action for partition (i.e. forced sale) in
district court to satisfy its Medicaid recovery lien.

In any event, it is undisputed that Cathie Peterson did not pay anything for the life estate
remainder interest that her father gifted to her in 2001. Nor is it disputed that Melvin incurred
$171,386.94 in Medicaid benefits, which the state is entitled by law to recover, and that the estate
has insufficient funds to pay, absent the inclusion of the value of Cathie's gifted remainder interest
in the real property.
The evidence at hearing also convincingly demonstrated that Cathie expended considerable
sums of money both maintaining and improving the residence at issue after receiving the gift deed
from her father. There is no testimony or other evidence in the record to show whether and by what
amount said expenditures increased the fair market value of the residence and real property.
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III.
DISCUSSION
A.
INCLUSION OF THE LIFE ESTATE AS AN ESTATE ASSET
The primary issue in this case is whether the gifted life estate remainder interest can be
included as an estate asset for the limited purpose of satisfying the State's unpaid Medicaid lien,
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 56-218(4). This is the exact issue and argument(s) presented to
Judge Gaskill in the Grothe Estate. As the court previously advised the parties in 2008, Judge
Gaskill's reasoning, rationale and conclusions on this exact issue are deemed persuasive and correct
by this court. A copy of said decisions is attached hereto and incorporated by reference. For the
reasons set forth therein, the life estate remainder is deemed to be an estate asset for Medicaid
recovery purposes only, and the court has jurisdiction to establish a lien against the property owned
by Cathie Peterson.

B.
VALUATION OF THE GIFTED REMAINDER INTEREST
Because the State now concedes that it must enforce its lien in a separate district court
proceeding against the real property, this court need not quantify the value of that lien in dollars. It
is sufficient to simply note that IDAPA 16.03.05.837.01 (aka rule 837) shall be applied to the
undisputed facts to determine the valuation formulae applicable to the gifted life estate remainder
interest as a matter oflaw. Ms. Peterson's arguments against applying the law (IDAPA) to this case
are adequately addressed and rejected in Judge GaskilJ's Grothe decision, and his rulings are
equally applicable here.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

lfetl

Page 4of8

This lien arose within the context of a probate proceeding. It would therefore seem
appropriate to utilize the date of death fair market value of the real property, as that is the inventory
valuation date for all estate assets. See LC. 15-3-706. However, this is a question of law over which
the presiding district judge in the anticipated partition action will have free review.

c.
OFFSETS TO VALUE OF REAL PROPERTY
Cathie Peterson alleges that the value of the real estate should be reduced or offset due to her
improvements. The State objects to any offset, reduction, or credit, arguing in its brief that she has
lived on the property for free since her father's death in March of 2007. The State's position is
unpersuasive, as it ignores the fact that Cathie is the owner of the property and has the legal right to
live there "rent free". Certainly, the State's grievance would.never be aired ifthe estate had
sufficient liquid assets to cover the Medicaid claim.
To the extent that the State implies that this estate proceeding has been unnecessarily
prolonged to benefit Ms. Peterson, the State has no one to blame for that circumstance but itself.
The State's former counsel in particular only sporadically took action to keep this litigation moving
forward. The petition to remove Ms. Peterson as the personal representative wasn't filed until
September of 201 O; about two years after it had become apparent that Ms. Peterson and her attorney
Mr. Finney were pursuing her own individual best interests and not the enumerated responsibilities
of a personal representative. See LC. 15-3-703, et seq. The State, having sat on its rights and
contributed to the delay in the administration of this estate for so long, cannot now be heard to argue
that Ms. Peterson's claimed improvements to the subject property should be ignored by the court.
Having concluded that equity requires the court to consider the evidence in support of Ms.
Peterson's claims of improvement, the court must deny those claims for the following reasons. In its
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brief: the State classifies all of Ms. Peterson's improvements to the property as mere "maintenance".
While many of her claimed improvements can accurately be so described, others are clearly beyond
that which can be considered ordinary maintenance.
For example, the new metal roof, fence, three new fibergla5s and steel doors, and $3,800 for
new windows are clearly material improvements and not mere maintenance. (Ex. 1) However, there
is no evidence before the court to demonstrate the enhancement in fair market value to the property
as a result of said material improvements. The court agrees with the State that where equitable
contractual relief is sought, the proper measure of unjust enrichment is the increase in value to the
asset improved, and not the amotmt expended. Nielson v. Davis, 96 Idaho 314, 528 P.2d 196 (1974)

In her Responsive Brief, Ms. Peterson argues that she should be given a dollar for dollar
credit, but fails to quantify the total dollar amount she seeks. No expert witness testimony was
offered at hearing regarding the resulting enhancement in value to the house. Nor did Cathie
Peterson, as owner of the property, offer the court her opinion of the property's enhancement in
value as a result of her improvements and expenditures. Having failed to supply the court with
sufficient evidence to quantify her claim to enhanced value, the court must decline Ms. Peterson's
request for a credit or offset.

IV.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing shall constitute this court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. This court
has jurisdiction over Cathie Peterson and the establishment of the State's Medicaid recovery lien
against the gifted real estate that she owns. The value of the gifted life estate remainder at the time
of Melvin's death is an estate asset for Medicaid recovery purposes, which will be valuated
pursuant to IDAPA rule 837. Any necessary partition of the real property asset to enforce the state's
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lien will be pursued in a separate action in district court. Cathie Peterson has failed to prove
equitable entitlement to a credit or offset of value for improvements to the property at issue. Mr.
Cartwright will submit a judgment consistent with the foregoing.
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, regular mail,
postage prepaid, this ~day of j).f<:..RMbek 2011, to:
W. Corey Cartwright
Deputy Attorney General
3276 Elder, Ste. B
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0009
Brent C. Featherston
Attorney at Law
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 838674

John A. Finney
FINNEY, FINNEY, & FINNEY, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
120 E. Lake St., Ste. 317
Sandpoint, ID 83864
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OPINION AND ORDER ON
PETITION FOR INCLUSION
OF LIFE ESTATElN
ESTATE INVENTORY

This matter is before the Court on the State ofldaho, bepartment of Health and Welf~e 1 s
(hereinafter ''Depart?Mnf~ Objection to Inventory and Final Account, and Petition t.o Require

Life Estate to be Included in 1nventory. The Court heard oral aI~ents on the mattei April 19,

2007 Following arguments, the Court set a status conference in the mattez for May 24t 2907.
On Mey 29, 2007, the Court 01dered the parties to submit briefing on the invento1y issue by June

251 2007. The Department is repiesented by attomey W. Corey Cartwright from the State of
Idaho Attorney General's of:fioe. The Personal Representative o£'1he Estate (hereinafter
'~state>~

is represented by attorney Erie K. Peterson. The Court, having read the objection and

petitio.n, the stipulation of fact-:; and the htiefs s-qbmitted by the parti~ having heard 01al

arguments of counsel~ and being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision
,..
bl t!ll Malm of lht .&tall af GrotJu

Opinion &Order on~ tnvsntory

May. J.

LUU~

1V:j~AIVI

. "ALIM

& ntLtMKt

UJV vr

MCUl~M!U

I~

V. I JV U

£.~rna,.,ATEDFAcrSANDPRQCEDURALBACXGROUND

Lloyd Grothe was bom on January 16, 1909. On August l, 2000, Mr. Grothe was
granted
medical ass.istance through the Medicaid program The program expended not less .than
'
$11,197.~l

in medical and nursing home care benefits for Ml: Grothe ~ming his eligibility

period. Lloyd Gro'tbe died on December 25, 2000 1 survived by his wife, Olive l Grothe, who
died on September 22, 2001.

On February 19, 2002 a Medicaid Hen WHS filed with the Secretary of State's office

against any assetoftheLloydand Olive Grothe estate. Pwsuantto lC. § 56-218(l)and(5), the
Department has a prio1ity estate claim fox Me(;licaid benefits paid on behalf of Lloyd Grothe. On
September 20, 2002, the Department filed a Petition fo1 Appointment of Personal Representative

in the matter of the estate of Lloyd and Olive Grothe. The Petition asserted the Department held
a valid lien against the estate, that no pers0nal representative had been appointed to probate the
estate and that the Department sought to assert its claim for Medicaid lien against estate assets,
in<:;luding real pIOperty located at 1024 :Hemlock in Lewiston, Idaho.
On September 23, 2007 an Order Appointing Public Administtatot was entered by the

Court. On Novembel 4, 2002, the Department filed a. Claim Agaipst Estate in the amount of
$11,197.24 and a Demand foz Notice, serving the same on the administrator. The Department's
claim was not disallowed and no Notice to Creditors has been published.

On January 13, 2003, attomey Erio Peterson filed a Resignation of Personal

Representative and Appointment of Suooesso1 Personal Representative in the abQve~entitled
probate action. The decedents' son, Gary Grothe, was appointed successor personal

1epresentative by the Court on January 16, 2003.
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On July 13, 2006~ the Department filed aPetitioo to Requite Payment of Claim. On

January 16, :2007, the Medicaid lien against the estate was renewed foi five (5) Yeafi by the
filing of a renewal with the Sectetaey of State,s office.
On Ap:ril 2, 2007, the personal representative filed a Petition f'o: Order Approving Charge

and Disehatge statement, Final Accounting, Final Settlement and Distdbution and a Cba.tge and
Discharge Statemen4 Final Accounting and Distribution Statement The filed documents listed
the real p:roperty at issue as having no value and included the notation 44fot disoloSUie purposes

only- no value listed on property as the property t$ not a probate asset- interest bdbre death was

a life estat.e ••. not subject to p1obat.e." A hearing on the Petition fox final settlement was
scheduied fur April 191 200?. However, prior to the hearing date, the Department filed an
Objection to Inventory and Final Account and Petition to Require Life Estate to be Included in
Inventory. The objection was raised during the Aprll 19, 2007 heariilg, resulting in the Court

setting the case for scheduling conference on May 24, 2007. During the scheduling .conference:,
the Court ordered the parties to file briefs by July 25i 2007 on the issue ofwhetbez the Hfe estate

is subject to probate as ari asset of the estate.
The following history is relevant to the issue before the CQurt. On August 16, 1977,

Lloyd and Olive Grothe. along with their son Gary Grothe, were the gramees of real property
located at 1024 Hemlock in Lewiston, Idaho The deed provided each of th(3 Gl:othes a one-third
interest in the property. 1 On Februazy 21 1998, Lloyd and Olive Orothe conveyed their interest in
the real property to Cary and Maria Grothe2 by a deed of gift., but zeserved a life estme in the
3

property. On August 11, 20QO, Gaty Gtoiqe, acting as attorriey in fact for Lloyd Grothe,

1

Bxlu'bit "A" to the Stipulation of Facts :tiled April 19, 2007
Oa:ry. Ol:othe is the son of Lloyd and Olive Oroths Maria Grothe is the wife of Gary Grothe
:! Bx.bibi1 "B" to the Sttpulation ot:Fac:ts :filed April 19, 2007.
2
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conveyed Lloyd's life estate interest in the real property to Olive Grothe. Lloyd Grothe died
Deceµiber 25, 2000 a:nd Olive G:tothe died September 22, 2001.

ANALYSIS
The parties agree that the Department has a vali4 claim for r~vary 9f Medica.id beilefits

paid on behalf of Lloyd Grothe and that the Deparlment timely filed a claim in the probate
action 4 1.n dispute is whethe1 the life ema,te interest held by Olive Grothe is an asset that must be

listed i!i the estate inventory. The Department contends the l\fe esta.te is an asset that must be
included in the estate inventory as I..C. § 56-218(4) allows the Departtnent to leak to the life
estate for

1ecovery of expended Medicaid benefits. The Estate takes the position ~ the

Depart:rncm:t must initiate a separate action outside of the probate proceeding to enfbrce whatever
rights the Department may have in Iegard to the life estat:e. At~~ are Idaho's pi:obate code

and Idaho's public assistance code, in particular I.C. § 15·1-201(15)' and I.C § 56-~18(4). The
issue, which appears to be one of first impression in Idaho, requires the Court to dcte:rmble
whether the statutory schemes are in conflict or can be reconciled.
The Estate begins its argument by propoundmg the commqn law principal that when the
futerest held in teal property is a life estate. upon the dooih of the holder of the li:f'e estaU; title
and control passes immediately to the remaindern:ia.n. Based on that pi:e.tnlse, the Est.ate contends
Olive Gtothe's life estate extinguished the moment Olhie Grothe died and, therefore, there is no

property ~set subject to probate and/or inclusion in the pro'¥e invento:ry. The common law

'!he personal repesentativ~ states in i:its brlef filed June 25, 2007, pages 3-4: ''Tht State. by virtue of the
application of' Idaho Code section 56-218, is a secured Cl'editDr of the probate estatt. A funely cteditots claim was
pra«nted by the Staie and not denied. The $bite, again pmuant to the provisions of Idaho code scctiQJl S6-2 l 8,
holds a seeurcd hlterest in the ~real property interlst as against the cunent owner of the property "
s The dcfinitio;Q of 'estme' is cll.rrellt;ly found at IC § 1S·1·201(16) bl.ll was locaud at l C § 15-1-201(15) in .2002.
4
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principal espoused by the Estate is correct Nevertheless, the legislature has the power to modify
the common law. Kirkland v. Blaim County Medical Center, 134 Idaho 464, 4 .P.3d 111 S

(2000): 6 "Whil~ we recognize that Idaho's info.tmal probate laws encourage ptompt and eff}cient
settlement of estates> they do ni>tevince a public policy of encouraging_ distribution before estate

llabtiities have been asC$rfain~d and paid." Hintze v Black, 125 Idaho 655, 659, 873 P. 909
(Ct.App.1994) [emphaSis added].
The Bstat~ while impliedly conceding the life estat;e may have value in the context of

IC § 56-218, cont.ends the life estate interest held by Olive Gtothe falls outside the probate code
de:finitiop. of estate, making it a non·probate asset not sul}ject to incl~ion in the probate
inv~tory.

Idaho's ptob~e code deflnes 'estate' as follows:

"Estate" means all property of the deceden~ including community property of the
survi'1ing spouse subject to administration, property of tnists, and property of any
other person whose affairs ate subject to this code as it exists from tiine to time
during admmisttation.
I.C § 15·1·201(15).

The Estate concedes Idaho's public assist.$.tice law specifically includes alife est.ate as an
estate asset for puzposes of recovery Of Medicaid benefits, but contends the De.Pattm.ent must

bring an action outside of the probat.e proceedings ro assert its rights. The relevant public
assistance law reads as follows:
For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include:
(a) All zeal and personal property and other assets included wit.bin the
individual's estate, as defined for pwposes of state probate law; and
(b) Any other real and personal property and ~ther assets in which the
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such
interest), including sucli assets conveyed to a surviv01: 1 hei:r, or assign of the

6

~.use it is proper~ within the power ofthe legislatme to emblisli statutes of':limitil.tions, statutes of~,.

create new causes of action. and otn«rw.ise 1llOdify tbe common Jaw without violating separation of powers

principle&, it necessarily follows t1vn the legisla.mre also bas the p<1'iV6l to limtt remedies ava.ilahle to plaintiffs
without vio.l.Wng the separation of power$ doctrine" Kirkl.fJl'Ji.v Blaine Cl1flntj Medical Center, 134 Idaho at 471
in the Mtmet qj IN &late of Grothb
OpiDion &Older Ott E$tate Inventory

s

43lo

r

I// L?

~.

May.

L:UU~

1U: jbAM

'~LIH

&WtLrAKt UJV Ur

MtUl~AJU

No. I jb~

deceased individual through joint tenancy, tanancy in common. survivorship, life
est.ate, living ·ttust or other m:rangement
l.C: § 56-218(4).
Tlie question raised iri the instant matter requires the Court to engage in ~tutory · ·
inteipletation and c6.nstruction in orde:t to determine whetbt.r I.C. § 15.:"1-201 (15) and I.C. §·56-

218(4) are in conflict; can be I'e!Xlnciled, or if one statute controls over the other.
Interpretation of a statute begins with an ~tion of the statllte's lite:tal words.
State v Bumight; 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999). Where the
language of a statute is plain ~ UDambiguous, courts give effect to the statute as
wri~ without engaging in statutory construction State v. Rhoil8, 133 Idaho
459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999)i State v Etcobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d
65, 67 (Ct.App.2000). If a court must engage in statutory construction, then its
duty·is to~ and give effect to the intent of the legislatme. Bwd; 135
Idaho at 646,, 22 P.3d at 121. In so doing, we look to the context of the st.aiutory
language in question and·the public policy behind the smti.tte. State v. Cw:ld, 137
Idaho 625, 627, 51 P.3d 439, 441 (Ct.App 2002). When an ambiguous statute is
part of a larger sta:tuto:ry scheine, we not only focus upon the langU.age of the
ambiguous statute, but also look at other~ relating to the same subject
matt« and consider them together in 0rder t.o discern ie~slative ~t ~ale v.
Pactorek, 137 Idaho 629, 6~2, 51P.3d443,446 (CtApp.2002).

State v Shanb, 139 Idaho 152, 154, 7.5 P.3d 206 (Ct.App.2003).
Tue Court has traditionally used a two-st.ep approach tQ l~gislati:ve int.etpletatiOri..
"We interpret statutes according to the plain, express meaning of a provision iri
question. and we will ~sort to judicial construction only if the pro-vision is
ambiguous, incomplet.e, absurd, or arguably in conflict Y.litb other laws.'' Pea1ley
Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith, 132 Idaho
742, 979 P.2d 605, 615 (1999).

1n

Sandpoint Indeperuisnt Highway District v. Board ofCounty Commissioners, i38 Idaho 887,
890, 71P.3d1034 (200~).

The language in LC. § 56-218(4) is plain and unambiguous. For purposes of Medicaid

benefits recovery, the de:furl:tion of 'estate' has been expanded by the Idaho legislature to include
a life estate interest in real property'. Yet, the expanded language has not been added to the

definition of estate in the probate code. Nevertheless. Idaho Code§ 1.5-1-201(15) includes
1

Addcd.PUtSUMt to 42 U.S C.A § l396p(b)(4)(B)

Jn thtMa1tet of the Estala i;Jf Grothe
Opinion & Otder on Sstate Jnv.:ntory

6

L\31

r.

I~IL?

May. 5. 2008 10:36AM

ucALTH

&WELFARE 01v

o~ M~u1cA1u

No.

/3b~

~.

l~/D

'catclHll' language that reads, " .. and property of any other pe:rso11 whose affairs are subject to
this code as it exists :from time to time during arlministration."

In comparing the two statutes, it is evident they relat.e to ili;e same subje~ -the

composition of the 'estate' of a deceased individual~ making the statut_eB in pari materia.
Statutes axe in pari material if they xelate to the same subject. Grand C(lll)Jon
Dories v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 124 Idaho l, 855 P.2d 462 (1993). Such
statutes are cons!Iued together to effect legislative intent Id. Where two statutes
appear to apply to the same case or subject matter, the specific statute will control
over the more geneial statute. State v 1James 133 Idaho ~78, 987 P.2d 290
1

(1999)

Gooding County v. Wybenga, 137 Idaho 201 1 204, 46 P. 3d 18 (2002)

The probate ·oode specifically states, "This code shall be liberally consttued and applied
to promote its undetlying purposes and policies." I.C. § l5-1-102(a). The Code then provides:

The underlying purposes and policies of this oode are:
(1) to $nplify and clarify the law concerning the affairs of decedents1 missing
persons, protected persons, mmors and incapacitated pezsons;
(2) to discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distn'bution oflrls
property;

(3) t.o promote a speedy and efficient system for liquidating the estate of the
decedent and making distribution to his suooessors;
(4) to :facilitate use and enforcem.ent of eertain trust'si
(5) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.

!.C. § 15-1-102(b); See a]s() In re Estate of Elliott, 141Idaho177,.181, 108 P.3d 324 (2005).
When I.C. § 15-1-201(15) andI.C. § 56-218(4) are considered togethei, along with the
underlying pmposes and policies of the probate oode, and the code is liberally construed and
applied to promote those purposes and policies, the intent of the legislature becomes clear. By
expanding the definition of 'estate' in I.C. § 56·218, it is clear the legislature intended issues

regarding recovery of public assistance medical bena to be addressed in the probate piocess.'

•
•

'While the issue Wore tbt Conrt inl:n te Ert¢e efJaakmim, 132 ldaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998) was clistinguis.bable
from tbe.iss'l.lt before this Court. .tb.e Sup.rmie Court in JtJ.Ckmaii had no dift'lculty teeoneiling 42 US .c. § 1396p,
now codified at I C. § S6-2l8, with Idaho's ptobate code, and in particul!ll· with IC. § lS.-1·201(15).
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However. because the expanded definition is applicable only fot the limited issue of public
assist.a.nee recovery, it would have been error to add the same language to the probate code. To

do so would have created a geneial expansion that would have allowed all credit.ors to look to the
eXpanded assets for recovery. Su.ch was clearly not the intetrt of the ~lature nor was it

necessary.
By expanding the assets tha\ can be reaobed for the limited purpose of rerovery of

Medicaid benefits, the legislature cteated a. specific statuta that conttols over the moie general
probate statute. Such a scheme is consistent witbi and fa.I.ls within the language of, I.C. § 15·1•
201 (15), as it allows into the probate proceedings "property of any other petson whose affairs are
subject to this code as it exists from time to time du.r.ing administration"" Questions relative to a
life estate and the property interest of a remaindenna.n fall squarely within this language. Those

questions, such as detexm:ining the value of a particular life estate the mo~mt 1'efore death
occur.re~

do not change whether asked within the confines of a probate proceecling or in a

separate action and the questions are as amenable to being answered in a p.robe.te proceeding as
they would be in a separate proceeding.9

The pwpose ofproba.t.e proceedings is to pro'Vide an effec#ve and efficient process in
which to resolve !Ill creditors, claims and f)S&et dis1ribution issues as they telate to a deceased
individual. This pmpose can only be effectuated wbtn the probate code is hoerally construed
and applied so that the underlying purposes and policies att attained. That includes addressing

those assets the legislature declared to be estate assets for th~ limited purpose of a claim fur
The Est.at.a in the instant cut directs the Cowt to the langilage fbund mI C. § SC..21 S(S) that reads, "A1rt
distnbution or ~ of the estate prior to swzymg such olaim is voidable and lll4Y be set asi~ by an action in ti»
district court " the :Estate asserts this language mipports its ]lO£ifuJn that the Pepartment mwt brhlg a separate
action to Je<:OVC'if against the }ife estate intertst Of 0~ Grothe. The Cowt is not pmwaded. Whmi the language is
l1ad ln c-<>ntcxt with tha entire code seation, it is evident the lll1lgllflge :is
at the procedural means thr
challenging the dism1mtion of an asset by the pe:tl!Oll appointed within the probate prooeeding to adm.inistm the
estate The language is not directed at a challenge to the propez eompc$itioD ofthe esiate.
9

dit••
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recovery of Medicaid benefits. Contrary to the atguments of the Estate. LC. § 15-3-709 declares

it the duty and responsibility of the person.al representative to take control and/or possession of

all potential as.sets of the estate, whether or not title is disputed, so that propt;r administratio~ of
the estate may he accomplished, which includes addresfilng ~ claims against the estate along
with the Qistribution of assets

ORDEB

Itis h+iebythe Order of the Court that, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 15-1-201(15) and Idaho
Code § 56~218(4), the life estate held by Olive Gtothe prior to her death~~ be included in the

estate inventory and a value de~ed ~ attributed to the life estate real property interest for
the limited purpose of satisfying, in pait or in whole, the State ofidaho, Department of Health
and Welfute's valid and timely filed claim for recovery of Medicaid benefits r~eived by Lloyd
Grothe.

D~ this ~y of Aup 2007.
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P.O. Box 1510

Lewiston, ID 83501
United States of America

PATfY b..WEEKS
cLBRK OF Tim 90URT

CERTirICATE OF MAlLlNG

L\ y l

r. LL/ L~

From: NPC Magistrate
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

)
)
)
OLIVE J. GROTHE and LLOYD GROTH, )
husband and wi f c,
)
)
Deceased.
)
)

CASE NO. CV02-02163

lN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF

OPINION AND ORDER ON
AMENDED PETITION FOR
APPROVAL OF CHARGE AND
DISCHARGE STATEMENT, FINAL
ACCOUNTING, FINAL SETTLE-

MENT AND DISTRIBUTION

This matter is before the Court on the Amended Petition for Order Approving Charge and
Discharge Statement, Final Accounting, Final Settlement and Distribution filed by the Personal
Representative of the Estate and on the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare's Second
Objection to Inventory and Final Account and Petition to Establish Value of Life Estate. The
Court heard oral arguments on the matters March 20, 2008. The Department of Health and
Welfare is represented by attorney W. Corey Cartwright from the State of Idaho Attorney
General's office. The Personal Representative of the Estate is represented by attorney Eric K.
Peterson. The Court_, having read the Petition of the Estate, the Objection and Petition of the
Department, the briefs submitted by the parties, having heard oral arguments of counsel, and
being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 8, 1977, Lloyd and Olive Grothe, along with their son Gary, purchased the
real property at issue. The deed provided that Lloyd, Olive and Gary each held a one-third
interest in the real property. On February 2, 1998, \vhile reserving a Life Estate interest in the
real property, Lloyd and Olive Grothe executed a Gift Deed wherein they each conveyed their
one-third interest in the real property to their son, Gary Grothe, and his wife Maria.
Lloyd Grothe applied for and was approved to receive Medicaid benefits effective August
1, 2000. On August 10, 2000, Lloyd Grothe was granted Medicaid benefits for nursing home
care. On August 11, 2000, Lloyd Grothe deeded his life estate interest in the real property to his

wife, Olive. From August 1, 2000 until his death on December 25, 2000, Lloyd Grothe received
$11, 197.21 in Medicaid medical and nursing home benefits. Olive Grothe died September 22,

2001. In 2001, the value oftl1e real property at issue was assessed at $110,830.00. On February
19, 2002, Idaho Department of Health and Welfare ("Department") tiled a Medicaid lien against

any real or personal property of the Lloyd and Olive Grothe Estate. 1
On September 20, 2002, the Department initiated the above-entitled matter by filing a
Petition for Appointment of Personal Representative. An Order Appointing Public
Administrator was entered by the Court on September 23, 2002. The Department then filed a
Claim Against Estate and Demand for Notice on November 4, 2002. The Department's claim
sought payment for Medicaid benefits paid on behalf of Lloyd J. Grothe in the amount of
$11,197.21 pursuant to LC.§§ 56-218(1) and (5).

1

The Medicaid line was renewed for an additional five (5) years on January 16, 2007.
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On January 14, 2003, a Resignation of Personal Representative and Appointment of
Successor Personal Representative was filed. Gary W. Grothe 2 was subsequently appointed as
Personal Representative of the Estate of Grothe ("Estate"). On January 30, 2003, the Estate filed
a Petition for Exempt Property Allowance in the amount of $10,000.00 pursuant to LC. § 15-2403. No furlher action occurred in the case until July 13, 2006. when the Department filed a
Petition to Require Payment of Claim. On April 2, 2007, the Estate filed an Inventory, a Charge
and Discharge Statement, Final Accounting and Distribution Statement and a Notice of Ilearing.
The real property of the Estate was omitted from the inventory. When the Estate filed its Pinal
Accounting. the real prope11y asset was valued at zero (0), noting that the Estate held only a life
estate interest in the real property and further noting there would be no payment on the claim
filed by the Department.
On April 4, 2007, the Department filed an Objection to Inventory and Final Account, and
Petition to Require Life Estate to be Included in Inventory. On April 19, 2007. the Court heard
oral arguments of counsel on the issue of whether the life estate interest must be included in the
Estate inventory and whether the Department's lien and claim against the life estate was properly
brought in the probate action. Following oral arguments, the Court allO\-ved the parties the
opportunity to present briefs on the issue. On August 9, 2007, the Court entered its Opinion and
Order on Petition for Inclusion of Life Estate in Estate Inventory. "vherein the Court held that the
life estate interest in the real property was an asset that must be valued and included in the
probate inventory for the limited purpose of Medicaid recovery.

2

Gary Grothe was the only child of Olive and Lloyd Grothe and was named as the personal represented in the Last
Will and Testament of Olive Grothe, which was filed with the Court after the above-entitled action was initiated by
the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare. Olive Grothe had two other children from a prior marriage, both of
which were named in Olive Grothe's Last Will and Testament.
Jn the }vfatter ofGrothe
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On February 29, 2008, the Estate filed an Amended Inventory, an Amended Charge and

Discharge Statement, Final Accounting and Distribution Statement, Amended Petition for Order
Approving Charge and Discharge Statement, Final Accounting, Final Settlement and
Distribution and requested the Court set the matter for hearing. The amended documents listed
the life estate interest in the Estate inventory, as previously ordered by the Court, but valued lhe

asset at zero (0). On March 6, 2008, the Department filed a Second Objection to Inventory and
Final Account and Petition to Establish Value of Life Estate, Memorandum in Support of Second
Objection and Petilion, and a Notice of Hearing. The Court took the matter under advisement
after hearing oral arguments of counsel on March 20, 2008.
Before the Court was able to enter its written ruling, additional filings were submitted by
the parties. On March 26, 2008, the Estate filed a Brief re Supplement to Amended Charge and
Discharge Statement, Final Accounting and Distribution Statement. The Estate's supplemental
brief indicated the personal representative's intent lo abandon the life estate asset pursuant to LC.

§ 15-3-902 and asserted the asset was, therefore, no longer subject to the probate proceedings.
On March 31, 2008. the Department filed a Motion to Strike, asserting th<: Estate's 'new'
position was untimely under J.C.§ 15-1-401 and I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3) and sought to insert new issues
into a matter already pending before the Court. On March 31, 2008, the Estate filed a Response
to Motion to Strike, asserting J.C. § 15-3-715(11) did not require the personal representative to
seek court approval to abandon the asset and that the action was not one thal required a hearing.
On April 2, 2008, the Estate filed a request for Judicial Notice of an unrelated Medicaid recovery

case, designated as Nez Perce County Case No. CV2007-01416.
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ANALYSIS
The Court finds it necessary to deal first with the post hearing filings of the parties. After
the hearing. but before the Court could enter its written ruling regarding the issue of value to be
attached to the lite estate, the Personal Representative notified the Department that the lifo estate
asset was being abandoned pursuant to l.C. § 15-3-715( 11 ), thus taking the life estate out of the
probate proceedings. The Estate contends it has the authority to abandon the asset and need not
seek approval from the Court before doing so.
Idaho Code § 15-3-715(11) reads:
Except as restricted or otherwise provided by the will or by an order in a formal
proceeding and subject to the priorities stated in section 15-3-902 of this code, a
personal representative, acting reasonably for the benefit of the interested persons,
may properly:

( 11) Abandon property when, in the opinion of the personal representative, it is
valueless, or is so encumbered, or is in condition that it is of no benefit to the
estate;
In the instant matter, the Personal Representative is without authority to abandon the life
estate asset. On August 9, 2007, the Court ordered that the life estate asset be included in the
Estate inventory and ordered that it be valued for purposes of the Department's claim for
Medicaid recovery. Once the Court issued its Order, the authority of the Personal Representative
to abandon the a..%ct was lost. The statute states in clear and unambiguous terms, "Except as
restricted or othcnvisc provide by the will or by an order in a formal proceeding .... " I.C. § 153-715. (emphasis added).

As a further note, the Court is at a loss to understand the purpose behind the Estate's
Judicial Notice filing. The Court recognizes the Department's right to foreclose on its lien by
means of a separate action when no probate has been filed, as occw-red in the case cited by the
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Estate in its judicial notice filing. 3 However, the instant case is distinguishable. Tlere, a probate
proceeding was filed. A probate proceeding is a proper avenue for the filing of a Medicaid
recovery claim. eliminating the need for a separate recovery claim action. 4 Therefore, the Court
finds the case cited in the Estate's Judicial Notice to be inapplicable to the instant matter.
The primary matter before the Court is what, if any, value should be attributed to the Iifo
estate asset of the Estate. The Estate, despite the Court's earlier analysis, continues to argue
common law rules regarding life estates. As discussed by the Court in its earlier decision,
Congress and state legislatures have the power to modify the common law. Thal is precisely
what Congress and many States, including Idaho, did when they enacted Medicaid recovery
statutes and, in particular, amended those statutes to expand the definition of "estate" to include
various real property interests that may be subject to Medicaid recovery.
The Medicaid program was created in 1965 when Congress passed amendments to the
Social Security Act authorizing states to set up comprehensive plans for supplying medical
services to indigents and provided for states Lo receive matching federal funds for the programs.

West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. DH.HS, 132 F.Supp.2d 437 (S.D.W.Va2001). To qualify for
Medicaid benefits, applicants must show they are aged, blind, disabled or the parent of a minor
child and that their income and resources are insufiicient to meet the <.:osts of neces~ary care and
services. Id. The eligibility determination allows applicants to exclude the value of their home
for purposes of eligibility only. The home value exclusion thus allows persons with a potentially
valuable asset to receive benefits along with those who have greater financial need. Id. at 440.
Congress addressed this anomaly through estate recovery." Id at 440
3

The Estate asks the Court to take judicial notice ofNe:z Perce County Case No. CV07-014 J6. The proceedings in
that case arc clearly distinguishable as no probate was ever filed following the death oftbe estate holder and the case
was dismissed after the Department recovered its Medicaid claim from the estate.
4
The propriety of Medicaid recovery within the probate proceeding was addressed in the Court's earlier decision
and, therefore, will not be addressed here.
In the !vfa1ter ofGrothe
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In 1993, "Congress passed the estate recovery provision as part of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993 to counterbalance rocketing Medicaid expenditures and overall
budget and deficit reductions.'' Id. at 440. Under the 1993 provision, Congress requires states to
recoup benefits from the estates of certain Medicaid recipients as a condition to receiving
Medicaid fonds, while still allowing states to provide for recipients to retain their home during
their lifetime,. Id. at 440. Persons subject to estate recovery arc given notice of the recovery
requirement and. therefore, accept or reject Medicaid long-term benefits with full knowledge that
their home may one day he subject to a recovery claim. Id. States that fail to participate in estate
recovery risk losing all or part of their Medicaid funding. Id.
J\s articulated by the Supreme Court of Nevada, estate recovery acts encompass two
important policy considerations.
First, the government has a legitimate statutory interest in recovering the amount
of correctly paid Medicaid benefits from a deceased Medicaid recipient's estate,
which includes the recipient's ownership interest in property at the time of death.
This interest arises from foderal legislation mandating that states establish an
estate recovery program in order to receive federal Medicaid funding. Estate
recovery provisions were initiated in light of increased demands for Medicaid,
which stemmed from the growth of the nation's aging population. Congress was
concerned with projections indicating that Medicaid funding will be insufficient
to meet claims within the next thirty years. The federal statutes not only
condition the states' receipt of Medicaid fonding on efforts seeking recovery from
a deceased recipient's probate estate, but they also permit states to expimd the
definition of "estate" to include property held in joint tenancy and various other
ownership interests at the time of death.
However, the federal and state statutes also reflect concem for the second policy
consideration, avoiding spousal impoverishment. Congress has Jong been
concerned with preventing spousal impoverishment. The legislation attempts to
strike a balance between these policies by limiting reimbursement efforts to
situations where impoverishment is no longer an issue. The foremost
consideration is enabling states to help more people in need of Medicaid get
assistance.

State ofNevada Department of Human Resources v. Ulmer, 87 P.3d 1045, 120 Nev. 108
(Nev.2004).
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The Medicaid program is structured so that an individual does not have to fall into
poverty before help is available. If eligible, an individual may 'postpone' his or her financial
obligation to pay for medical care until the recipient's assets are no longer needed by the
recipient or the recipient's spouse. Medicaid is intended to act as a safety net not a free ride.
Medicaid is not an avenue by which one can shift his or her financial burden for medical care to
the American taxpayer, while a recipient's heirs enjoy a financial windfall. In the instant malter.
the Court finds the Estate's efforts to avoid paying the Department's Medicaid recovery claim
untenable. Medicaid benefits \.Vere not forced upon the Grothcs. Rather, they made an election
to receive Medicaid benefits and it is the receipt of those benefits that gives rise to the repayment
obligation.
In providing for the expanded definition of "estate", Congress sought to close the
loophole crafted by Medicaid recipients seeking to divest the program of much needed tax
dollars while still preserving assets for the benefit of the recipient's heirs. Contrary to the
continued argwnents of the Estate, common law rules of law are not applicable to the issue
before the Court as the common law has been modified by federal and state lawmakers. Hy
adding the real property interest known as a life estate to the Medicaid recovery statutes,
lawmakers intended a value to be attributed to the asset and for the value be subject to Medicaid
recovery claims. To interpret the statute any other way would defy logic and render the statute
meaningless. Therefore, the Court finds the lite estate must be attributed a value of $39,796.83,
as calculated by the Department based on IDAPA 16.03.05.837. The life estate interest and its
corresponding value must be included in the Estate inventory and must be recognized as an asset
available for payment of the Department's Medica1d recovery claim.
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ORDER
The Petition for Order Approving Charge and Discharge Statement, Final Accounting,
Final settlement and Distribution filed by the Personal Representative of the Estate is hereby

DENIED.
It is the further Order of the Court that the Life Estate Interest may not be abandoned by
the Personal Representative of the Estate and that Petitioner must attribute a value of $39, 796.83
to the Life Estate for purposes of payment of the Department's Medicaid Recovery claim.

l.

Dated this

rJJi\0\1ay of April 2008.

-------=~-----··-----·-------

JAY P. gAsKlLL,
I

'
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL f)~' 8~tRY
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY <§ff-BOT INQ4B_Y, .
~
DEPUTY CLER

In the Matter of the Estate of
MELVIN PETERSON,
Deceased.
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)
)

Case No. CV-2007-266
ORDER RE: VALUE OF ESTATE
INTEREST

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-)
An evidentiary hearing on all remaining issues in this estate having been held on

September 29, 2011, Cathie Peterson appearing individually through her attorney, Brent C.
Featherston, Attorney at Law, and Cathie Peterson also appearing through John A. Finney,
Attorney at Law, representing her interests as former personal representative of this estate, and
the State ofldaho, Department of Health and Welfare (the Department or state), appearing
through W. Corey Cartwright, Deputy Attorney General, and the court having received written
closing arguments and legal memoranda, and having issued its Memorandum Opinion, filed
December 22, 2011,
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1. The court's Memorandum Opinion shall constitute its findings of facts and
conclusions of law herein;
2. The value of the estate's interest in the real property gift deeded to Cathie Peterson, as
recorded in instrument #204218 in Boundary County, shall be that proportion of the fair market
value of the entire fee interest in the real property, to wit:
ORDER RE: VALUE OF ESTATE INTEREST - 1

45~
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· · - ·~

Tax #5, being part of Lot Five (5), Block Two (2), Moyie Springs Townsite and described as
follows:
Commencing at the Northeast Corner of Lot Five (5), Block Two (2), Moyie Springs Townsite;
thence West along the North Line of Lot Five (5), a distance of 40 feet to a point; thence
Southwesterly along Moyie Street a distance of 140 feet to a point; thence South 63 feet to a
point; thence East 95 feet at a point on the East line of Lot 5; thence North 125 feet to the
POINT OF BEGINNING.
as calculated by the reference tables set forth in IDAPA 16.03.05.837, and the Department shall
have a lien upon said property for such value;
3. Cathie Peterson is not entitled to any credit or offset for sums expended to maintain or
improve the real property while in her possession;
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that any necessary partition of the real property
asset to enforce the state's lien shall be purs
ENTERED this

/

0

taday 0£ anuary, 2012,

ORDER RE: VALUE OF ESTATE INTEREST - 2

ourt.
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Attorneys at Law
113 South Second A venue
Sandpoint, ID 83 864

John A. Finney
Finney Finney & Finney, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
Old Power House Building
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint, ID 83864
W. Corey Cartwright
Deputy Attorney General
3276 Elder, Ste. B
PO Box 83720
Boise, ID 83 720-0009
DATED this

jSl day of January, 2012.
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
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In the Matter of the Estate of
MELVIN PETERSON,
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CASE NO. CV-2007-00266
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Deceased.
~~~~~~~~~)
TO:

THE RESPONDENT IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE,
AND THE RESPONDENT'S ATTORNEY, W. COREY CARTWRIGHT,
DEPUTY ATTOR..t~EY GENERAL AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVEENTITLED COURT

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT Cathie Peterson, individually, herein
APPELLANT, appeals pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83 and Idaho Code§ 17-201, as follows:
1.

The title of the court from which the appeal is taken is the Magistrate Division of

the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho in and for the County of
Boundary, Magistrate Judge Justin W. Julian, presiding.
2.

The title of the Court to which the appeal is taken is the District Court of the First

Judicial District of the State ofldaho in a...11d for the County of Boundary.
3.

The date and heading of the judgment or decision from which the appeal is taken

is the Order Re: Value of Estate Interest, entered January 10, 2012.
rtatfimtm .{aw 1'fnn Cfd
'DanielP. j'eatlierstim
'Brent C. J'eatfterston•
Jeremy P. j'eatlierston
fllttJJmeys at Law
113

s. Suornf.Plve.

Sandpoint, Itfalio 83864
(208) 263-6866

7'a:t(208} 263-0400
"'L,,ic.ensetf in

ltfalio & 'Washington

4.

The appeal is taken upon both matters of law and matters of fact.

5.

The testimony and proceedings of the original trial or hearing were recorded by

NOTICE OF APPEAL - I
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II
the Boundary County Clerk and are in the possession of the Boundary County Clerk

The

proceedings resulting in the Order were held on September 29, 2011 .
6.

The issues on appeal upon which the Appellant intends to assert in the appeal

(but such list is not an exhaustive list), and provided that any such list of issues on appeal shall
not prevent the Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal thereafter discovered by the
Appellant is as follows:
a.

Did the Magistrate err in the findings of fact and conclusions of law

contained in its Memorandum Opinion.
b.

Did the Magistrate err in its valuation of the Estate's interest in real

property owned by Cathie Peterson and described in the Order Re: Value of Estate's Interest and
placing a lien upon said property in favor of the State.
c.

Did the Magistrate err in determining that it had jurisdiction to issue its

Order Re: Value of Estate's Interest.
d.

Did the Magistrate err in finding that Cathie Peterson was not entitled to

any credit or offset
DATED this

3rd

day of February, 2012.
FIRM,CHTD.

Attorney for Cathie Peterson
Individually
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PROCEDURAL IllSTORV

This matter began with a Petition for Infonnal Probate of the estate of Melvin Peterson
("Estate').

Cathie Peterson, the decedent's daughter (''Cathie"), was appointed Personal

Representative on July 26, 2007. The State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare ("State")
filed its creditor claim ec1aim") against the estate on November 30> 2007 for reimbursement of
Medicaid funds paid on Melvin Peterson's ("Melvin'') behalf during his lifetime. The Claim was
disallowed by the Estate with a request for itemization on November 30~ 2007. The State filed an
"Amended Claim" shortly after which was also disallowed. The State filed its Petition for

Allowance of the Amended Claim which was heard and granted by the court on March 25, 2008.
On May 5, 2008, the State filed a Petition to Require payment of the Claim seeking
payment of $171,386.94 of Medicaid benefits paid during Melvin's lifetime. At the hearing on
June 12th, the Court ordered the payment of the State's Claim and further finding that the Melvin's
life estate reserved a "Gift Deed'' to Cathie dated December 6, 2001, be deemed an asset of the
estate for purposes of the State recovering its Claim. The Trial Court ordered Cathie to pay the
Claim from these assets.
On August 6, 2008, the Personal Representative filed a Motion to Hire Appraiser. The
State

objected and the Court agreed to the extent that the Estate was pennitted to only hire an

appraiser to value the fee title of Cathie's home, not the life estate retained by Melvin as of the date
of his death. The State also filed a Motion to Compel Sale of Home and Payment to Department,
which the Court granted. The Estate appealed these rulings to the District Court. The District
Court reversed the Trial Court and remanded on May 25, 2010.
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Based upon the State's actions to sell Cathie's home, Cathie, individually, filed a Demand
for Notice and Special Appearance on September 17, 2010, reserving issues of jurisdiction, venue.
service of process, and due process.

Concurrently, Cathie filed a Motion of Automatic

Disqualification under ffi.CP Rule 40 (d)(l). The trial Court denied the motion to disqualify. The
State objected and moved to strike Cathie's special appearance, which was denied. The State
Petitioned for the removal of Cathie as Personal Representative. The Trial Court granted the
petition and appointed the State as Successor Person Representative, citing, in part, Cathie's

conflict of interest evidenced by her special appearance through separate counsel. The Estate
appealed this ruling to the District Court. The District Court affinned.
On remand, the State, the Trial Court set the matter for "Court trial" on September 29,

2011. The State, as successor personal representative, did not file any pleadings or notices of what
claims. issues or other matters were to be detemrined or tried. Rather, the State proceeded at the
date of ti-ial, to present the testimony of Cathie and then submitted the Personal Representative's
Requested Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Court set a briefing schedule and
subsequently issued a Memorandum Opinion on December 22, 2011 directing the State to prepare
and present an appropriate judgment. The Trial court entered an Order Re: Value of Estate Interest
on January 10, 2012. Cathie filed her Notice of Appeal February 6, 2012.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 2

05-30-'12 17:10 FROM-FEAT

STON LAW FIRM

2082630400

T-788 P0006/0022 F-657

('

U.

STATEMENTOFFACTS

On March 26, 1997, Melvin, together with a third party, Alicia Whitman, took title to a
home and property in Moyie Springsi Idaho. The testimony at trial established the home was in
very poor condition with foundation and structural deficiencies. On December 5, 2001, Melvin
conveyed all ownership ro Cathie by deed with the following language included: '•RESERVING

UNTO GRANTOR A LIFE ESTATE IN SAID PROPERTY". Ex. A.
Cathie testified that by this time she resided in the home and was caregiver for her father.
Cathie expended over $3,000.00 of her own money in making improvements to her very modest
home :from December, 2001, until the State asserted a claim to the property in this proceeding. In
late 2002, Cathie and Melvin filed suit to clear title :from Alicia Whitman
Melvin applied for and received Medicaid benefits begiru:ring several years after deeding the
home to Cathie. The record contains no indication that the State disqualified or penalized Melvin
as a result of his life estate.
Upon Melvin's death on March 3, 2007, the Court appointed Cathie as Personal
Representative of the Estate. As Personal Representative, Cathie filed an inventory of the Melvin
Peterson Estate. Upon the Court's Order to do so, Cathie included in the inventory of the Estate of
Melvin Peterson, the "life estate" at a zero value.
The State's positiOll in this litigation is well summarized by its objection to the Estate's

motion to hire an appraiser. The State asserts that an appraiser is not "qualified to provide such
opinion evidence because he is not an actuary or a person otherwise possessed with specialized
k110wledge of life expectancies". The State's position at Trial in September (and as early as 2008
when the Estate proposed to hire an appraiser) is that the appropriate valuation of Melvin is life
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estate is to determine fair market value of the fee ownership of and then to apply the "life estate
table contained in LD.AP.A. § 16.03.05.837.02 ... in order to properly determine the actual value
of the life estate interest."
The Department has been intent on using the I.D.A.P.A. Table from the beginning, refusing
to permit a qualified opinion of value.
Cathie has !!£m been joined in this action as an individual by virtue of any service of
process or appropriate notice to her of the State's intent to sell the property that is her home. 1 By

virtue of her position as the prior personal representative, she became aware that the State of Idaho
intended to force the sale of her residence and home and appeared by special appearance without
waiving these jurisdiction and due process issues.

At trial in September, 2011, the State presented no evidence as to the value of the real
property or life estate in question and sought a ruling that the Estate is owner of a 38~642% interest
in Cathie's home. Closing Brief, p.6.
The Trial Court agreed and entered :findmgs pursuant to I.C. § 56-218 and I.D.A.P.A. Rule

837, accordingly.

1

The State's Motion to Sell Cathie's home was never served upon Cathie) individually. Cathie
has participated since September, 2010, only pursmmt to a Special Appearance.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF· 4
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ID.

ARGUMENT

For purposes of clarity, it may be helpful to be reminded of the legal nature of the interests
created by the Gift Deed from Melvin to Cathie.
Fee simple absolute title by a grantor can be split during the
conveyance into a present estate and a future estate. The most
common present estate is the life estate. The creation of the life
estate usually involves words indicating that the possession is for
life or some similar limitation .... without language giving the life
estate O\vner the right to dispose of the property; the future interest
cannot be conveyed by the life estate owner ..... there are two types
of future estates associated with the life estate. These are the
reversion and the remainder . . . . A remainder is used when the
grantor wants to convey ownership of the future interest to a third
party.
121Am.Jur.-ProofofFacts3d, 101 (2011).
It appears that Melvin conveyed all future interest in the property, a vested remainder
interest, to Cathie subject only to his reserved present interest, a life estate. As indicated above,
Melvin lost all right to that future interest conveyed to Cathie, upon execution and delivery of the
Gift Deed in 2001. His only reserved present interest was the life estate. The question raised on
this appeal is whether the life estate was properly included by the Trial Court in Melvin's estate for
purposes of satisfying the State's claim.
A.

Idaho Code § 56-218 does not apply in these circumstances.

The Trial

Court~s

Memorandum Opinion asserts that "[t]he primacy issue in this case is

whether the gifted life estate remainder interest can be included as an estate asset ....pursuant to
LC. § 56~218(4). Memorandum Opinion, p.4.
2

The Trial Court does not explain or define this tel'II1 and it appears to misstate the legal
property interests that are at issue in this matter. Melvin reserved to himself a "life estate" but
granted the "remainder interest" to Cathie.
APPELLANT'S BRJEF - S
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The Trial Court ruled that Melvin's life estate is included as an estate asset that is subject to
Medicaid recovery, and references the Second District Magistrate Oaskill's decision in Jhe Matter
of the Estate of Grothe.

It appears that the Department's position is that this definition of estate

assets overrides the common law or Probate Code by including life estates as an asset of the
decedent at death.

1.

Language ofldaho Code §56-218

"Words and phrases are construed according to the context and the approved usage of the
language, but technical words and phrases, and such others as have acquired a peculiar and
appropriate meaning in law, or En'e defined in the succeeding section, are to be construed
according to such peculiar a:nd appropriate meaning or definition/' Idaho Code Ann. § 73-113
(2012).

The succeeding section provides definitions as follows:
(d)

"Property" includes both real and personal property;

(e)

"Real property" is coextensive with lands, tenements
and hereditaments, possessory rights and claims.
Idaho Code Ann. § 73-114 (2012)

The plain language of the statute at issue was misread by the Trial Court to require the
inclusion of Melvin's life estate.

For purposes of this section. the tenn "estate" shall include:
(a)

all real and personal property and other assets included
within the individual's estate, as defmed for purposes of
state probate law; and

(b)

any other real and personal property and other assets in
which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time

APPELLANT'S llJUl?.F- 6
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of death, to the extent of such interest, including such assets
conveyed to a survivor, heir or assign of the deceased
individual tllrough joint tenancy, tenancy in common,
survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement.
I.C. § 56-218(4)(2011)
[emphasis added]

a.

Subsection (b) does not include Melvin's reserved lite estate.

TI1e Trial Court appears to rely in error upon subsection (b). The statute does not state that
a decedent's life estate is included in his estate. Rather, it seeks to include in the estate, for
recovery purposes, assets in which the decedent held a legal interest "at the time of death, to the
extent of such interest". The statute goes on to specifically identify as assets of the estate "such
assets conveyed (by decedent] to a survivor ... through joint tenancy, tenancy in common,
survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement."

Subsection b makes no mention of

including a life estate "retained" by the decedant., only a life estate or other interest that has been
conveyed to a "survivor, heir or assign of the deceased individual;'.
To explain, I.C. §56-218(4)(b) recognizes that Melvin could have conveyed his property to
his daughter for his lifetime. That life estate to Cathie would leave a future reversion interest after
Melvin's death. The statute insures that that remainder interest must revert back to Melvin's estate
at his death. The statute insures that that interest must be included in the estate for Medicaid

recovery purposes.

Likewise, a conveyance by Melvin to Cathie in joint tenancy, tenancy in

common or with right of survivorship, would req\lUe that the estate recover that interest to Melvin's
estate for Medicaid recovery.
In this instance, Melvin did not convey a life estate interest to Cathie before his death. If he

had, that interest would be subject to estate recovery in the estate. Melvin conveyed a remainder

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 7
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interest subject only to his reserved life estate.
For that reason, the latter portion of the statute quoted above was misapplied by the Trial
Court. The Court should reverse and remand to the trial court with instructions to correct these

fmdings. It can be inferred from the plain language of subsection b, that the legislature intended to

identify those assets in which the decedent's interest succeeds or continues after his death; Le. a
remainder or reversionary interest after the life estate conveyance ceases upon his death, an interest
that may otherwise be subject to survivorship transfer such as co-tenancy or joint tenancy. But the
statute clearly does not specify a life estate held by the decedent at time of death as an asset of the
estate for recovery purposes.

Since Idaho Code §56-218(b) does not specifically require inclusion of Melvin's life estate
into estate assets, does Idaho probate code require include the life est.ate under subsection (a)?

b.

Idaho Code §
estate.

56~218(a)

does not include a life estate in the

Idaho Code.§ 56-218(4)(a) provides that the term estate shall include "all real and personal
property and other assets included within the individual's estate as defined for J,2.urposes ofstatf}.

probate law''- I.C. § 56-218(4)(a)(2-012).
The Idaho Probate Code imposes a duty upon the personal representative to inventory and
appraise all "property owned by the decedent at the time of his death. listing it with reasonable
detail, and indicating as to each listed item its fair :market value as of the date of the decedent's
death;'. IC.§ 15-3-706 (2012).

Idaho Code§

15~1M201(16)

defines an "estate" as ''all property of the decedent, including

community property of the surviving spouse, subject to administration, property of trusts, and

Al'PELLANT'S BlUlW - 8
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property of any other person whose affairs are subject to this code as it exists from time to time
during administration''. Idaho Code§

15-1~201(16)(2012).

"A life estate is an interest in real property, the dmation of which is limited by the life of
some person." Tobias v. State Tax Commission, 85 Idaho 250, 255, 378 P.2d 628, _

(1963);

quoting Thompson on Real Property, Volume Il, § 780.
"It is important to realize, hovvever, that if the deceased owned a life estate during his or her
life, the life estate will terminate upon death and will not be part of the estate." 121 Am.Jur. Proof of Facts 3d, 101 (2011).
The Court included the life estate as an asset of the Estate. The Trial record contains no
testimony or evidence that would indicate a value of the life estate, or even any authority that the
life estate is an asset of Melvin's estate. The Trial Court and the State have taken as an assumption

that the life estate is properly an, asset of the estate under relying entirely upon an improper reading
of Idaho Code § 56-218. However, the Department's inteipretation of I.C. § 56-218(4)(b) is not
supported by the actual language of the statute.

Relying upon the Second District decision in Grothk. with. really no independent analysis.
the Trial Court concluded that Melvin's life estate must be included in the estate assets. Grothe

Court concluded that the Idaho Legislature, in adopting Idaho Code§ 56-218, must have intended
to modify the common law so as to include life estates as estate assets for purposes of Medicaid
recovery. However, that conclusion is not supported by the plain language of the statute, as

discussed above.
From this

conclusion~

837 to "value" the life estate.

APFELLANT'S BRIEF - 9
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B.

Rule 837 is inapplicable by its own terms.

Tue State ofldaho argues that I.D.A.P.A. 16.03.05, entitled Rules Governing Eligibility for
Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled, diet.ates the Court's ruling in valuing Melvin's life estate at

the time of his death.
Rule 837 reads in pertinent part as follows:
RULE 837 - LIFE ESTATE AS ASSET TRANSFER.
01.
Transfer of a Remainder Interest. When a life estate in
real property is retajned by an individual, and a remainder interest in
the property is transferred during jl}c; look back period_for less than
the fair market value of the remainder interest transferred, the value
of the uncompensated remainder is subject to the assert transfer
penalty as described in Sections 831 tlrrough 835 of these rules. To
compute the value of the life estate remainder, multiply the fair
market value of the real property at the time of transfer by the
remainder factor for the narticipant's age at the time of transfer
listed in the following table:

I.D.A.P.A. 16.03.05.837
[underline added]
A simple reading of Rule 837 makes clear that it was not adopted for the application
proposed by the State in this matter. The Rule clearly states its intent to compute a '°transfer
penalty" where a Medicaid recipient/applicant has improperly transferred a remainder interest and
retained to himself a life estate "during the look back period far less than the fair market value of

the remainder interest".

By its very language above, the Rule~ and the computation table within it, is used during the
lifetime of an applicant holding a life estate to detennine

eligibility~

or appropriate penalty, for

transfers dwing the look back period. 3 Since one can assume that Medicaid assistance applications
3

Asset transfer penalties are assessed pursuant to Rules 831 through 836 to Medicaid
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are not submitted by decedents but live persons requiring medical care, it is obvious error to apply a
life est.ate calculation table that assumes the holder to be alive, to determine the value of a life estate

at time of death.
Valuation of a life estate during the holder's life time, is a recognized activity.
"The value of the life estate is determined by a fonnula which talces
into account the age and life expectancy of the Jjfe tenant. The
longer the life expectancy of the life tenant, the greater is the value
of the life estate".

West v. Tax Commission, 99 Idaho 26, 27,
576 P.2d 1060, 1061 (1978).
At no time does the State or the Trial Court provide authority for the application of Rule
837 to a decedent's life estate at the time of death. Again, the Trial Court accepts the Grothe
decision wholesale, with no independent analysis.
The process of determining an asset transfer penalty during the lifetime of the Medicaid
participant certainly involves actuarial determinations, however, the valuation of a life estate, at the

time of a measuring life's death, no longer logically involves those same actuarial detenninations.
The decedent has died. There is no accounting for future life expectancy.

The Idaho Probate Code requires only that a Personal Representative prepare an inventory
of property ~'owned by the decedent at the time of his death". Idaho Code§ 15-3-706. It does not
require a determination of assets owned prior to the death of the decedent or up to the date of death,
but only those assets at the time of his death. It is undisputed that, at coi.nmon law, a life est.ate
ceases to exist at the death of the holder and therefore has no value, nor is it an asset of the estate.
Tobias v. State Tax Commission, 85 Idaho 250, 255, 378 P.2d 628, _
participants in long term care or H.C.B.S. See I.D.A.P.A. 16.03.05.831.
APPELLANT'S BIUEF • ll
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Thompson on Real Property, Volume II, § 780.
Since the life estate terminated at Melvin Peterson's death, there is no asset to value. The
Trial Court's application of Rule 837 to set such a percentage value is improper and should be
reversed and remanded with instruction that the life estate has no value. 4

4

The State presented no evidence of value to the life estate other than applying Rule 837.
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This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to determine the issues before

it.
"It is the general rule that where title to real property is an issue between an estate and its
heirs and a third person, such issue must be tried in an independent action brought for that purpose
in a competent tribunal and cannot be tried by the probate court." In re Lundy's Estate, 79 Idaho

185, 193, 312 P.2d 1028, 1032 (1957). "A Probate Court cannot try the question of title as those
issues must be brought in Disttict Comt." fu re Blackington's Estate,

29 Idaho 310, 158 P.

492 (1916).
The Stat:e sought and received a CoUit Order that the Estate has a percentage interest based

upon the asset transfer tables set forth in Rule 837. This finding is beyond the subject matter
jurisdiction of the probate court. As indicated all along, Cathie is appearing only through a special
appearance resetving jurisdiction, both personal and subject matter. The State failed to achieve
process upon Cathie or her property in doing so.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 13
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The Court lacks personal Jurisdiction over Cathie.

Cathie was originally appointed as personal representative of the Estate. At no time has she
been personally served with any process as an interested party holding legal title to the real property
the State seeks to sell so as to satisfy its claim..

A judgment entered without meeting the jurisdictional requirements of service of process or
due process. deprives the court of julisdiction over the person and is void. McGloon v. Gwynn, 140
Idaho 727. 100 P.3d 621 (2004)
"The right to procedural due process guaranteed under both the Idaho and United States
Constitutions requii:es that a person involved in the judicial process be given meaningful notice
and a meaningful opportunity to be heard." McGloon v. Gwvnn, 140 Idaho 727, 729, 100 P.3d
621; 623; 2004 WL 2377859 (2004)

Cathie submitted to the Court's jurisdiction as Personal Representative at the time of her
appointment in 2007. Idaho Code §15-3-602. The Trial Court continued to have jurisdiction
over Cathie after her removal as to her position as "Personal Representative'', but at no time has
the State provided meaningful due process to Cathie, individually, as to her interest in the real
property that they seek to sell so as to satisfy the State's Claim against the Estate.
Cathie has participated subject only to a Demand for Notice and Special Appearance
reserving these issues of jurisdiction. This Court is asked to reverse the Trial Court's Order Re:
Value of Estate Interest as it was entered unlawfully and without due process upon Cathie,
individually.
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E.

The Trial Court disregarded the testimony that Cathie invested significant
funds into the Property in reliance upon her Deed from Melvin.

The testimony at tri.al was undisputed that Cathie invested over $3000.00 into
improvements into the property in the belief that she owned the property from time of the deed in
December, 2001. Trial Exhibit 1 totals $2,982.51 of expenditures on the property, not including
numerous others for which receipts no longer exist. She testified the property was in significant
disrepair when she took title and that a quiet title was necessacy to clear a third party's ownership
from the title. From 2001 until 2007 when Melvin died, the State took no action to give Cathie
notice of their intent to take her home from her and the investment she had made into improving
that home. Even the State's Notice of Statutory Claim letter dated April 24, 2007 (Ex. 5)
acknowledges that at common law a life estate "dies" with the life tenant, but reiterates the
State's misreading ofldaho Code §56-218 to include Melvin's life estate in his estate for

Medicaid recovery purposes.
Inexplicably, the Trial Court disregarded Cathie's documented investment into the
property made in reliance upon her legal title to the property. This Court is asked to reverse the
Trial Court and remand with instmction to allow Cathie recovery of her investment into the
property.
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CONCLUSION
This Court: is asked to reverse the Trial Court and remand with instructions to the Trial

Court to make findings and conclusions, as follows:
1.

Melvin Peterson conveyed fee title remainder mvnership to Cathie in certain real

property on December 5, 200 I, reserving to hlmself a life estate.
2.

Cathie, in reliance upon the deed. and as an occupant and possessor of said real

property during Melvin Peterson,s lifetime, made certain improvements and incurred expenses for
the improvement of the real property, as her residence, totaling several thousand dollars.
3.

Several years later, Melvin applied for and received Medicaid benefits through the

State ofldaho, Department of Health and Welfare.
4.

TI1e State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, apparently determined at the

time of Melvin's application that no asset transfer penalty should be imposed on the basis of
Melvin's then existing retained life estate.
5.

Melvin died March 3, 2007, and was 83 years of age.

6.

At common law, Melvin~s life estate terminated at the time of his death by operation

of law and leaving his estate holding no legal interest in the real property.

7.

The State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, filed a claim for Medicaid

benefits of$171)86.94.
8.

The State of Idaho was provided an opportunity at trial on September 29, 2011, to

introduce evidence of a proper valuation of the life estate of Melvin at the time of his death and
introduced no such evidence.
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...
9.

By operation of law, the life estate of Melvin ceased to exist at the time of his death

and, therefore, had no value.
10.

Idaho Code §56-218(b) does not alter, modify or repeal the conunou law principles

of life estates. Idaho probate code and case law does not include a life estatei measured by the life
of the decedent, as an interest in the Estate of that decedent.
11.

Rule 837 is specifically restricted to detemrining an appropriate value during the life

of a Medicaid beneficiary for purposes of imposing an asset transfer penalty and is, therefore,
inapplicable for purposes of determining a life estate value at the 1ime of death.
12.

The State, having foiled to provide any evidence as to the value of the life estate, no

such value or interest can be attributed Melvin's life estate in the real property conveyed by

Warranty Deed on December 5, 2001.
13.

The State is not entitled to any lien or interest attributable to the life estate at issue in

this matter.
14.

Further, Cathie was not properly made a party to this proceeding by service of

process or other appropriate due process that would vest the Trial Court with personal jurisdiction
over Cathie and her real property at issue.

15.

Further, the Magistrate Court, acting as Probate Court in these proceedings, lacks

subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Idaho law.
16.

Finally, Cathie equitably relied upon the Warranty Deed dated December 5, 2001,

and incurred expenses, improving the real property in reliance upon the deed from Melvin Peterson
totaling several thousand dollars.
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The Court further finds that the Department failed to file or perfect any proper lien

or other encumbrance which would provide actual or constructive notice to Cathie of the interests

claimed by the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare. As such, the Court finds that it
would be inequitable for the Court to impose a lien or assess an interest in the real property.
As prevailing party, the Appellant requests award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to
Idallo Code §12-117, 120, 121 and 123. for the reason that the State has acted unreasonably, and
without foundation in fact or law.
DATED this 301h day of May, 2012.

BRENT C. FEATIIBRSTON
Attorney for Cathie Peterson
Individually
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from an order establishing the value of the primary asset of the estate,
the life estate interest held by the decedent before his death. The underlying dispute involves a
creditor's claim filed by the State ofldaho, Department of Health and Welfare (the
"Department") for Medicaid estate recovery as provided in Idaho Code§ 56-218. "Medicaid
estate recovery" is a program required by federal Medicaid law that seeks to recover assets of
deceased Medicaid recipients, from their estates, in order to reimburse the taxpayers for
expenditures made during the Medicaid recipient's life. The Department's claim involves the
value of a life estate which the Medicaid recipient had retained upon gifting his real property to
his daughter, Cathie Peterson.
Course of Proceedings
Cathie Peterson was appointed personal representative in this matter July 26, 2007.
The personal representative mailed a "Notice to Known Creditor" to the Department on
August 6, 2007. She also published a Notice to Creditors with a first publication date of August
16, 2007.
On November 19, 2007, the Department filed a timely Claim Against Estate, in the
amount of $171,134.28, and a Demand for Notice.
Without stating any reason, the personal representative denied the Department's claim,
mailing a "Disallowance of Creditor's Claim and Request for Itemization" to the Department on
November 28, 2007.
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On December 10, 2007, the Department filed an Amended Claim Against Estate in the
amount of $171,3 86. 94. 1 At the same time, the Department filed a Petition for Allowance of
Claim.
The following day, the personal representative, again, disallowed the Department's claim
without stating any reason. See Notice ofDisallowance of Claim dated December 11, 2007. In
response, a Petition to Require Payment of Claim was filed by the Department on December 19,
2007, and a Petition for Allowance of Amended Claim was filed on December 28, 2007.
About January 2, 2008, the personal representative filed a document called "Objections"
in which she objected to the procedure, but still did not state any reason for the disallowance of
the claim.
After a hearing on March 25, 2008, the court entered its Order Granting Petition for
Allowance of Amended Claim.
On May 5, 2008, the Department filed a Petition to Require Payment of Claim, which
together with the Department's Brief in support of Petition to Require Payment of Claim, set
forth the Department's demand for payment of the value of the life estate. See Idaho Code § 56218(4)(b).
About May 28, 2008, the personal representative filed "Personal Representative's
Inventory." At the same time, the personal representative filed her Objection to Petition to
Require Payment of Claim, stating its position relating to the life estate.

1

Since health care providers have up to one year after the service to present claims to Medicaid, it is not
uncommon for the initial claim to increase somewhat.
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After a hearing, the Court entered its "Order on Petition to Require Payment of Claim" on
June 12, 2008. This order established the life estate as an asset of the estate for purposes of
Medicaid recovery and ordered the personal representative to amend the Inventory and assign an
appropriate value to the life estate.
About August 5, 2008, the personal representative filed her Motion to Hire Appraiser.
The Department objected, in part, by its "Objection to Motion to Hire Appraiser" filed August
11, 2008.
After a hearing, the Court entered its "Order Approving Hiring of Appraiser" on
September 23, 2008, approving an appraisal determining the fee simple value of the real
property.
On May 14, 2009, the Department filed its "Motion to Compel Short Form Appraisal"
contending the appraisal approved by the court in September, 2008, had never been performed.
On July 15, 2009, the Department filed its "Petition to Compel Sale of Home and
Payment to Department," together with a "Notice of Filing Appraisal Report and Addendum."
After a hearing on July 28, 2009, the court entered its "Order Granting Petition to
Compel" on August 11, 2009.
The personal representative appealed from this order, filing a "Notice of Appeal" about
August 19, 2009.
A "Decision on Appeal" was issued by the District Court on May 25, 2010, vacating the
"Order Granting Petition to Compel" and remanding "so that findings of facts and conclusions of
law can be established."
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About June 22, 2010, the personal representative filed a "Petition for Authority to Sell,"
together with a "Petition for Approval of and Partial Payment of Attorney Fees and Costs,"
seeking to liquidate an escrow account and pay the attorney for the personal representative. On
the same day, the personal representative filed an "Amended Personal Representative's
Inventory" for the first time listing the life estate in the inventory, but assigning the life estate a
value of $0.
On June 30, 2010, the Department filed its "Petition for Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law." A status conference was held on July 27, 2010, during which Judge Julian indicated an
evidentiary hearing would be held on October 21, 2010 to determine all remaining factual issues.
On July 28, 2010, the Department submitted its "First Requests for Admission" to the
personal representative.
After a hearing on August 10, 2010, the Court, on August 17, 2010, entered its "Order for
Partial Payment of Attorney Fees and Payment of Costs" approving a partial payment of attorney
fees in an amount to be stipulated by the parties. At the same time, the Court deferred the
Department's Petition for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to follow the trial scheduled
for October 21, 2010.
The parties' "Stipulation Regarding Partial Payment of Attorney Fees" was filed about
August 24, 2010, with the parties agreeing to reserve objections to the final settlement of the
estate.
About August 27, 2010, the personal representative submitted her Responses to First
Requests for Admission and thereafter, on September 7, 2010, the Department filed its "Notice
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of Deposition" to take the oral testimony of the personal representative. An "Amended Notice of
Deposition" was filed on September 15, 2010.
Two days later, on September 17, 2010, Attorney Brent Featherston filed a "Demand for
Notice and Special Appearance" on behalf of "Cathie Peterson, individually." Said notice also
stated: "The undersigned moves to vacate and dismiss all orders entered with regard to her real
property pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 12(b)." At the same time, attorney Brent Featherston, on
behalf of "Cathie Peterson, individually" filed a "Motion for Automatic Disqualification of Judge
I.R.C.P. 40(d)(l )."
On September 22, 2010, the personal representative (through attorney John Finney) filed
"Personal Representative's Final Accounting and Petition for Decree of Distribution." On the
same day, the Department filed its "Petition for Removal of Personal Representative for Cause"
and its "Motion to Strike." Also on the same day, attorney Brent Featherston, on behalf of
"Cathie Peterson, individually" filed an "Amended Motion for Automatic Disqualification of
Judge I.R.C.P. 40(d)(l)."
On September 27, 2010, the Court entered its "Order Denying Amended Motion for
Automatic Disqualification - IRCP 40(d)(l ). "
Also on September 27, 2010, the Department filed a "Notice to Vacate Deposition."
On September 28, 2010, the personal representative filed "Objections" to the
Department's petitions.
On October 7, 2010, hearing was held on the Department's "Petition for Removal of
Personal Representative for Cause" and its "Motion to Strike." On the same day, the court
entered its "Order Removing Personal Representative." Cathie Peterson, through attorney John

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 5

Z:\MRCases\Estate\WCC\WCC Open Cases\PetersonMelvin\DCourt\Respondents Brief3.wpd

Finney filed a Notice of Appeal, appealing the removal of Cathie Peterson as personal
representative about October 12, 2010. This court entered its Order, affirming the Magistrate, on
May 11, 2011.
Thereafter, the court issued a Notice of Hearing and a court trial was held on September
29, 2011. The parties submitted their closing arguments in writing. The court issued its
Memorandum Decision on December 22, 2011, and its "Order re: Value of Estate Interest" on
January 10, 2012.
This appeal followed.
Statement of the Facts
The relevant facts are simple. Melvin Peterson ("Melvin") was bor

and

died at the age of 83 on March 3, 2007. Petition to Require Payment of Claim, ,-r 1. Prior to his
death, but after reaching the age of 55, Melvin applied for and received state medical assistance
(Medicaid) benefits in the amount of$171,386.94. Petition to Require Payment of Claim,, 2.
Melvin owned real property in Moyie Springs which, on December 6, 2001, he conveyed to his
daughter Cathie Peterson, retaining a life estate. Exhibit "A" to Petition to Require Payment of
Claim. Melvin possessed this life estate interest at the time of his death.
Cathie Peterson lived on the real property in which Melvin owned a life estate interest
during his life, and thereafter, and performed maintenance and provided some modest
improvements to the structures on the property, but was unable to testify that her expenditures
had any affect on the value of the property. Tr. p. 38, ll. 7-9.
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ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Whether Cathie Peterson can now appeal the Magistrate's Order on Petition to

Require Payment of Claim (06/12/2008).
2.

Whether the Department should be awarded its attorney fees on appeal pursuant to

Idaho Code § 12-11 7.
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ARGUMENT

I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 83(u)(l) sets forth the standard ofreview for appeals to the
district court from the magistrate's division, as follows:
Upon an appeal from the magistrate's division of the district court, not involving a
trial de novo, the district court shall review the case on the record and determine
the appeal as an appellate court in the same manner and upon the same standards
of review as an appeal from the district court to the Supreme Court under the
statutes and law of this state, and the appellate rules of the Supreme Court.
Rule 83(u)(l ), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The Idaho Supreme Court in Hawkins v.

Hawkins, 99 Idaho 785, 589 P.2d 532 (1978), explained the import of Rule 83(u)(l):
We read [I.R.C.P. 83(u)(l)] as saying that a district court, in making an
appellate review of a magistrate's decision, should perform that task in the same
manner as this Court performs its appellate review of the trial decision of a district
court. In reviewing a magistrate's findings, therefore, the district courts should
adhere to the well recognized rule that findings based on substantial and
competent, though conflicting, evidence will not be set aside on appeal. Prescott
v. Prescott, 97 Idaho 257, 542 P.2d 1176 (1975); Isaguirre v. Eschevarria, 96
Idaho 641, 534 P.2d 471 (1975); I.R.C.P. 52(a).

Hawkins, 99 Idaho at 788-789, 589 P.2d at 535-536. Moreover, in Marchbanks v. Roll, 142
Idaho 117, 124 P.3d 993 (2005), the Idaho Supreme Court said:
Upon an appeal from the magistrate's division of the district court, not
involving a trial de novo, the district court shall review the case on the record and
determine the appeal as an appellate court in the same manner and upon the same
standards of review as an appeal from the district court to the Supreme Court
under the statutes and law of this state, and the appellate rules of the Supreme
Court. I.R.C.P. 83(u)(l) (2004).

***

Substantial evidence is " 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept to support a conclusion; it is more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance.'" Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., 136 Idaho
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761, 764, 40 P.3d 119, 122 (2002) (quoting Evans v. Hara's, Inc., 123 Idaho 473,
478, 849 P.2d 934, 939 (1993) ).

Marchbanks, 142 Idaho at 119, 124 P.3d at 995. With regard to the Magistrate's conclusions of
law, the Idaho Court of Appeals has said:
Where a district court sits as an appellate court for the purpose of reviewing a
magistrate's judgment, the district court is required to determine whether there is
substantial evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact. If those findings
are so supported, and if the conclusions of law demonstrate proper application of
legal principles to the facts found, then the district court will affirm the
magistrate's judgment. The judgment also will be upheld on further appeal. See
Ustickv. Ustick, 104 Idaho 215, 657 P.2d 1083 (Ct.App.1983).

Hentges v. Hentges, 115 Idaho 192, 194, 765 P.2d 1094, 1096 (App.,1988).

II.

THE DECISION OF THE MAGISTRATE
In Appellant's Brief, Cathie Peterson contends:
The State, as successor personal representative, did not file any pleadings or
notices of what claims, issues or other matters were to be determined or tried.
Appellant's Brief, p. 2. The suggestion seems to be that the Department was somehow to blame
for her being confused as to what issues were to be presented at trial. She had been, however,
until just before the hearing, the personal representative in this matter and had been contesting
the Department's claim to the life estate for some four years. In her first appeal to this court,
Peterson appealed the Magistrate's Order Granting Petition to Compel (08/11/2009) in which the
Magistrate ordered the real property to be sold and the Department to be paid $53,712, less a
proportionate share of the costs of sale. In that matter, Peterson argued that:
The Magistrate erred in purportedly concluding that the decedent had an
interest at the time of death and in purportedly determining the extent of such
interest, in certain real property based upon a life estate.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 9

Z:\MRCases\Estate\WCC\WCC Open Cases\PetersonMelvin\DCourt\Respondents Brief3.wpd

Appellant's Brief (11112/2009) p. 13. This court concluded its Decision on Appeal as follows:
Based on the foregoing, the trial court's August 11, 2009, "Order Granting
Petition to Compel Sale of Home. and Payment to Department" is vacated and the
matter is remanded so that findings of facts and conclusions of law can be
established.
Decision on Appeal (05/25/2010) p. 12. Thereafter, on June 30, 2010, the Department filed its
Petition for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law. Among the requested conclusions of law
were the following:
20.
The life estate, as it existed the moment before the death of Melvin
Peterson, is an asset of the estate, for purposes of the Department's Medicaid
recovery claim, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 56-218(4).
21.
Had Melvin Peterson transferred the life estate to Cathie Peterson
the moment before his death, the value of the transferred asset would have been
determined pursuant to IDAPA 16.03.05.837, which is .38642 of the fair market
value, or $53,712.38. The life estate factor of .38642 of the fair market value of
the real property is the appropriate valuation of the estate's interest in the real
property gifted to Cathie Peterson by the Gift Deed of December 5, 2001.
22.
Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 56-218(4), the estate is the owner of a
38.642% undivided interest in the real property described in Exhibit "A."
Petition for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (06/30/2010), p. 5, ifif 20-22. At the
hearing of this matter, the Department, having recently become the personal representative,
submitted its "Personal Representative's Requested Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law."
These had been altered only to reflect the Department's changed role and the fact that Peterson
was no longer personal representative. Among the requested conclusions of law were the
following:
7.
The life estate, as it existed the moment before the death of Melvin
Peterson, is an asset of the estate, for purposes of the Department's Medicaid
recovery claim, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 56-218(4).
8.
Had Melvin Peterson transferred the life estate to Cathie Peterson
the moment before his death, the value of the transferred asset would have been
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 10
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determined pursuant to IDAPA 16.03.05.837, which is .38642 of the fair market
value. The life estate factor of .38642 of the fair market value of the real property
is the appropriate valuation of the estate's interest in the real property gifted to
Cathie Peterson by the Gift Deed of December 5, 2001.
9.
Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 56-218(4), the estate is the owner of a
38.642% undivided interest in the real property described in Exhibit "A."
Personal Representative's Requested Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (09/29/2011). As
can be seen, the only difference is in the numbering and the removal of the fixed amount, since,
as personal representative, the Department would need to proceed to District Court in a partition
action to have the property sold and the proceeds divided. 2
So, there was no surprise here. It should have been obvious to all that the primary issue
for trial would be the valuation of the estate's interest in the real property. And this is exactly
what the Magistrate decided. In his "Order re: Value of Estate Interest" the Magistrate held:
2.
The value of the estate's interest in the real property gift deeded to
Cathie Peterson, as recorded in instrument #204218 in Boundary County, shall be
that proportion of the fair market value of the entire fee interest in the real
properly [legal description omitted] as calculated by the reference tables set forth
in IDAPA 16.03.05.837, and the Department shall have a lien upon said property
for such value;
3.
Cathie Peterson is not entitled to any credit or offset for sums
expended to maintain or improve the real property while in her possession;
Order re: Value of Estate Interest, pp. 1-2.

2

While the Magistrate saw this as a new position of the Department, the ultimate purpose of the Department's
petition to remove the personal representative was to allow the Department, as successor personal representative, to bring
a partition action in District Court against Cathie Peterson. See Tr. (10/07/2010) p. 5, II. 20-23; Respondent's Brief
(02/25/2011), pp. 27-28.
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III.
THE MAGISTRATE'S JUNE 12, 2008, ORDER ON
PETITION TO REQUIRE PAYMENT OF CLAIM IS FINAL
AND NOT SUBJECT TO APPEAL HERE.
A.
The Magistrate's June 12, 2008. Order Should Not Be Subject to Challenge in this Third
Appeal.
Peterson's first issue on appeal challenges the Magistrate's June 12, 2008, "Order on
Petition to Require Payment of Claim" in which the Magistrate held that the life estate retained
by the decedent was an asset of the estate for purposes of Medicaid estate recovery. See
Appellant's Brief, pp. 5-9. In Peterson's first appeal to this court, then as personal
representative, Peterson challenged this same order and holding. See Appellant's Brief
(11/12/2009) pp. 6-12. The Department contended that the June 12, 2008, order was a final order
that could have been appealed earlier, and, therefore, the appeal was too late, and barred. This
court, however, held that the June 12, 2008, order was interlocutory and not appealable, and
therefore, under the doctrine stated in Matter of the Estate ofSpencer, 106 Idaho 316, 678 P .2d
108 (Ct. App. 1984), prior interlocutory orders could be reviewed. Decision on Appeal
(0512512010), pp. 8-10. This court then remanded the matter for findings of fact and conclusions
oflaw. Id. at 12.

In Peterson's second appeal to this court she challenged her removal as personal
representative. Part of the grounds for her removal, however, was her failure to comply with the
June 12, 2008 order requiring her to give an appropriate value to the life estate as an estate asset.
Tr. (11126/2010) p. 34, ll. 9-19. Her failure to comply with this order was also argued in the
briefing. See Respondent's Brief (02/24/2011), pp. 25-26. Therefore, had Peterson desired to
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challenge the June 12, 2008, Order, she should have done so no later than in the second appeal
where it was directly in issue. Nothing in the Estate ofSpencer case suggests the ability to
challenge interlocutory orders goes on indefinitely.

If the court determines that the June 12, 2008, Order is still subject to appeal, then, the
following argument shows the life estate is clearly an asset of the estate for purposes of Medicaid
recovery:

B.

The Life Estate Is an Asset Subject to Estate Recovery.

In 1993, Congress enacted the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, commonly
referred to as OBRA '93. This act, codified primarily in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p, contained a number
of provisions intended to enhance Medicaid estate recovery, including strict restrictions on
transfers to trusts and an expanded definition of estate. These changes were made to assure
recovery of property that would otherwise pass outside of probate and, therefore might be lost to
estate recovery. Idaho adopted the expanded definition of estate effective July 1, 1995. It is
found in Idaho Code§ 56-218(4):
(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include:
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such
interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor. heir, or assign of the
deceased individual through joint tenancy. tenancy in common, survivorship, life
estate. living trust or other arrangement. 3

3

This language is taken word for word from 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B).

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF- 13

Z:\MRCases\Estate\WCC\WCC Open Cases\PetersonMelvin\DCourt\Respondents Brief3.wpd

Idaho Code § 56-218(4) (emphasis added). Therefore, for purposes of estate recovery, the estate
subject to the Department's claim includes a retained life estate held by a Medicaid recipient or
his spouse at time of death.
This, of course, is contrary to common law. At common law, a life estate terminated and
the interest passed to the remainderman upon the death of the holder. Where, as here, the life
estate passes an interest in property to a survivor or heir, Idaho Code§ 56-218(4)(b) abrogates
common law to the extent necessary to preserve the life estate interest for estate recovery.
Oregon has an estate recovery law very similar to Idaho's (indeed it is likely that Idaho's original
estate recovery law was copied from Oregon). Oregon has also adopted the expanded definition
of estate for purposes of estate recovery. In the case of State Dept. ofHuman Services v.
Willingham, 206 Or.App. 156, 136 P .3d 66 (2006), Oregon brought an action to recover the value
of a life estate of a deceased Medicaid recipient where, like here, the property had been conveyed
to the child of the Medicaid recipient, retaining a life estate. The facts are nearly identical to
those here. In the Willingham case, however, the life estate had been created in 1993 before the
1995 adoption of the expanded definition of estate. The Medicaid payments had been made after
the adoption of the new law. Therefore, the primary issue was whether the 1995 law would be
applied to the 1993 life estate. 4 The Oregon Court of Appeals examined the legal effect of the
expanded definition of estate and its application to life estates and concluded that the law
abrogated the common law, and the life estate interest was preserved after death for purposes of
estate recovery:

4

This issue is not present here. The life estate in this case was created December 6, 2001, well after the July 1,
1995, effective date ofldaho's law.
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Based on that change in the law in 1995, we agree with the state that the legal
effect of the legislature's amendment was to modify the common law rule that a
life estate interest is extinguished under the circumstances established by the
statute. For pm:poses of the recovery of medical assistance paid by the state during
the lifetime of the holder of a life estate interest. the life estate continues to exist
after the death of the person holding the interest.
Willingham, 206 Or.App. at 160, 136 P.3d at 68 (underline added); see also Bonta v. Burke, 98
Cal.App.4th 788, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 72 (2002) (where the Medicaid recipient mother had retained a
life estate and a right to revoke the remainder, the life estate was not extinguished on her death,
but rather was an asset of the estate for purposes of estate recovery); In re Estate ofLaughead,
696 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa 2005) (life estate in farm owned by deceased Medicaid recipient was
required to be included in the estate for purposes of estate recovery).
All of these cases consistently construe the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B)
which was adopted by each state, including Idaho.
C.

The Value of the Life Estate Is Determined at the Moment Before Death.
Peterson claims the life estate has no value because it is extinguished at death. However,

as shown by the cases cited above, the value of the life estate is determined the moment before
death, not after. This issue was specifically addressed in the case of In re Estate ofLaughead,
supra:
Whether Ruby, "at the time of her death," had an interest in the real property at
issue here is determined as of a point in time immediately before her death. See In
re Barkema Trust, 690 N.W.2d 50, 56 (Iowa 2004) (holding ''the phrase 'at the
time of death' means the time immediately before the Medicaid recipient's
death"). Immediately prior to her death, Ruby held a life estate in 338 acres of
land. For reasons that follow, we hold her life estate constituted an interest in real
property within the meaning of section 249A.5(2)(c ).
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In re Estate ofLaughead, 696 N. W.2d at 316. Any other interpretation would make the life
estate language in Idaho Code § 56-218(4)(b) a nullity. The court, of course, will not give a
statute an interpretation which would render it a nullity. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22
P.3d 116, 121(App.2001). The purpose of the expanded definition of estate is met by
recognizing the value of the property at the moment before the death of the Medicaid recipient.
Peterson offers a novel interpretation ofldaho Code§ 56-218(4)(b) in which she says it
would apply if the decedent had given Peterson his own life estate, i.e., transferred the property
to her for his life. However, that doesn't make any sense because the property would then revert
to his estate on his death and would be part of the ordinary probate estate. If that were the case,
Idaho Code§ 56-218(4)(a) would apply, and the life estate language in subsection (4)(b) would
be totally superfluous. Peterson's interpretation is not supported by any case law or other
authority.
Judge Julian was also persuaded by the opinions of Judge Gaskill in the very similar
Second District case of Matter of the Estate of Grothe, Nez Perce County Case No. CV02-02163
which he attached to his decision in this matter.

IV.
THE COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE
DEPARTMENT'S LIFE ESTATE VALUATION RULES.
Peterson argues that the life estate tables in Rule 8375 should not be used because the
tables should be applied only during the lifetime of the Medicaid recipient. Appellant's Brief, p.
10. That argument is not based on any specific language in the rule and does not make sense.

5

JDAPA 16.03.05.837.
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The life estate must be valued immediately before death. As explained in In re Estate of
Laughead, supra:
Whether Ruby, "at the time of her death," had an interest in the real property at
issue here is determined as of a point in time immediately before her death. See In
re Barkema Trust, 690 N.W.2d 50, 56 (Iowa 2004) (holding "the phrase 'at the
time of death' means the time immediately before the Medicaid recipient's
death"). Immediately prior to her death, Ruby held a life estate in 338 acres of
land. For reasons that follow, we hold her life estate constituted an interest in real
property within the meaning of section 249A.5(2)(c ).
In re Estate ofLaughead, 696 N. W.2d at 316. Had Melvin Peterson signed a quit-claim deed
immediately before his death, ceding his life estate interest to Cathie Peterson, the tables found in
Rule 837 would be applied. It makes no sense to say that some other measure should be used a
few moments later after Melvin Peterson had expired.
Peterson, for her part, has offered no other basis for valuing the life estate, other than to
again argue that there should be no value at all, in essence inviting the court to ignore section
218(4)(b) entirely. Appellant's Brief, p. 12. This is not a reasonable alternative. Having failed
to offer any reasonable alternative valuation of the life estate, Peterson should not be permitted to
simply object to the reasonable and obvious application of the life estate tables in Rule 837.

v.
THE MAGISTRATE HAD JURISDICTION TO
DETERMINE AND VALUE ESTATE ASSETS.
Peterson argues that the Magistrate lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine the
estate's interest in the real property. Appellant's Brief, p. 13. She cites In re Lundy's Estate, 79
Idaho 185, 312 P.2d 1028 (1957) for the proposition that the probate court does not have
authority to determine title to real property as between the estate or heirs and third parties.
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However, just as in Lundy 's Estate, Peterson is not a third party. The dispute in Lundy 's Estate
was between the decedent's surviving wife and his children from a prior marriage. The issues
that had to be decided included the validity of certain quitclaim deeds and a property settlement
agreement and whether, in light of those documents, the estate consisted of either community or
separate property. As to jurisdiction to determine the real property issues, the court explained:
It is the general rule that where title to real property is in issue between an estate
and its heirs and a third person, such issue must be tried in an independent action
brought for that purpose in a competent tribunal and cannot be tried by the probate
court.
However, this is not such a case. Here the issue is between the
administratrix claiming as sole heir and appellants claiming they are the sole heirs.
In probate proceedings the probate court is a court of record and has 'original
jurisdiction in all matters of probate, settlement of estates of deceased persons,
and appointment of guardians'. We have held that this probate jurisdiction
bestowed on the probate court by the constitution is exclusive.

***

Here no stranger or third party is involved. The issue is drawn between rival
claimants to heirship. As between such parties the probate court has jurisdiction
to settle all issues essentially involved in a determination of who are the heirs, and
the distributive share or shares of each.
In order to determine whether the property was community or separate and
thus to determine to whom it should descend it was necessary for the probate
court to pass upon the validity of the quitclaim deeds and the property settlement
agreement.
'Whether the property was separate property or community property was
one of the questions to be determined by the probate court and by the parties
submitted to that court for its decision. That court had authority to determine the
persons who, by law, were entitled to the property. and also the proportions or
parts to which each was entitled, who were the heirs of the deceased, and who
were entitled to succeed to the estate, and their respective shares and interests
therein.'
Lundy's Estate, 79 Idaho at 193-4, 312 P.2d at 1032-3 (citations omitted; underline added). Just

as in Lundy 's Estate Peterson is not a stranger or third party; she is the daughter of the decedent
and an heir of the estate. The question before the probate court was whether the life estate
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interest passed to her on the decedent's death or whether it remained an asset of the estate.
Having determined that the life estate was an asset of the estate, the probate court was also
competent to decide its value. While Peterson, who was personal representative for most of the
time this matter has been pending, likes to portray herself as an outsider and a third party,
nothing could be further from the truth.
Idaho Code § 1-2208(2) assigns probate and estate administration cases to the
magistrates. This is so irrespective of the value of the estate or its assets. Keeven vs. Estate of
Keeven, 126 Idaho 290, 882 P.2d 457 (App. 1994). Idaho Code§ 15-3-104 gives exclusive
jurisdiction to this court to determine claims against the decedent and his successors:
No proceeding to enforce a claim against the estate of a decedent or his successors
may be revived or commenced before the appointment of a personal
representative. After the appointment and until distribution, all proceedings and
actions to enforce a claim against the estate are governed by the procedure
prescribed by this chapter.

***
Idaho Code§ 15-3-104 (underline added). Peterson is, very clearly, a successor to Melvin
Peterson, as well as an heir. She is Melvin Peterson's daughter and the ordinary successor to the
remainder interest in the life estate.
Moreover, the personal representative of an estate has the authority and duty to value the
assets of the estate. Idaho Code§ 15-3-706. The personal representative may petition the court
and seek orders related to his duties. Idaho Code§ 15-3-105. Clearly the court had authority to
enter an order valuing the life estate as an estate asset.
The issue here is not whether the probate court could partition the property to divide
estate assets from non-estate assets. Now that the Department is the named personal
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representative, the Department intends to proceed to District Court with a partition action. The
Department represented as much to the Magistrate who made that part of his order. So any
division of the real property will ultimately be done by the District Court. The Magistrate merely
determined the assets of the estate and the value as between the estate and Peterson, an heir. This
was clearly with the authority of the probate court.
Likewise, there is no issue here with regard to personal jurisdiction. Probate cases are in
the nature of proceedings in rem and the court's orders apply to all who are given notice. As
stated in Connolly v. Probate Court in and for Kootenai County, 25 Idaho 35, 136 P. 205 (1913):
The Supreme Court of California in that case, after stating that the proceeding for
the distribution of an estate is in the nature of a proceeding in rem, which is in the
hands of an administrator or executor for distribution, says: "By giving the notice
directed by the statute, the entire world is called before the court, and the court
acquires jurisdiction over all persons for the purpose of determining their rights to
any portion of the estate; and every person who may assert any right or interest
therein is required to present his claim to the court for its determination. ***"

Connolly, 25 Idaho at_, 136 P. at_ (quoting William Hill Co. v. Lawler, 116 Cal. 359, 48
Pac. 323 ). Notice requirements for probate proceedings are set forth in Idaho Code § 15-1-401.
There is no question that Peterson had notice of these proceedings since she participated in them.
Idaho Code§ 15-3-106 states:
Subject to general rules concerning the proper location of civil litigation and
jurisdiction of persons, the court may herein determine any other controversy
concerning a succession or to which an estate, through a personal representative,
may be a party. Persons notified are bound though less than all interested persons
may have been given notice.
Idaho Code § 15-3-106 (underline added). Peterson appeared at the evidentiary hearing,
participated, and offered her own evidence. It cannot be more clear that the court has jurisdiction
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to determine the rights between the Department and Peterson relating to the assets of this estate,
including the life estate.
Finally, the evidentiary hearing was held at the urging of this Court at the conclusion of
oral argument on Peterson's second appeal, and was for her benefit, to permit her to present such
evidence and arguments as she thought necessary. The personal representative could simply have
assigned the value of the life estate and proceeded to bring a partition action in the District Court.
It seems odd that Peterson would object to the jurisdiction of the court to determine issues she
presented at a hearing held for her own benefit.

VI.
THE COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO GRANT AN
OFFSET TO CATHIE PETERSON.
Peterson complains that the Magistrate "[i]nexplicably ... disregarded Cathie's
documented investment into the property .... " Appellant's Brief, p. 15. However, Judge Julian
neither disregarded her evidence nor was his ruling inexplicable. To the contrary, Judge Julian
found that the expenditures made were "improvements and not mere maintenance."
Memorandum Opinion, p. 6. He then went on to say:
However, there is no evidence before the court to demonstrate the enhancement in
fair market value to the property as a result of said material improvements. The
court agrees with the State that where equitable contractual relief is sought, the
proper measure of unjust enrichment is the increase in value to the asset
improved, and not the amount expended. Nielson v. Davis, 96 Idaho 314, 528
P.2d 196 (1974).

In her Responsive Brief, Ms. Peterson argues that she should be given a
dollar for dollar credit, but fails to quantify the total dollar amount she seeks. No
expert witness testimony was offered at hearing regarding the resulting
enhancement in value to the house. Nor did Cathie Peterson, as owner of the
property, offer the court her opinion of the property's enhancement in value as a
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result of her improvements and expenditures. Having failed to supply the court
with sufficient evidence to quantify her claim to enhanced value, the court must
decline Ms. Peterson's request for a credit offset.

Id
This holding is well supported in the record. At the hearing of this matter, Cathie
Peterson testified of the expenses she incurred while maintaining the real property. She also
testified that she had never paid rent for her occupying the real property, including during the
time that the decedent was the life tenant. She testified that the decedent went into the nursing
home shortly after the gift deed was executed in 2001. Therefore, she occupied the home alone
until his death in 2007. It is understandable that she would at least maintain the property.
To the extent that Peterson sought an offset for improvements to the property, it was
incumbent on her to show that the improvements actually enhanced the value of the property.
When directly asked ifthe work she testified to increased the value of the property she was
unable to say it did or to quantify it:

Q:

Do you know whether, uh, whether any of the maintenance you did
to the house, somehow, increased it's value?
A:
Very hard to say. I don't know.
Tr. p. 38, 11. 7-9. The Magistrate's denial of an offset is well supported in fact and law.

VII.
THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY
FEES ON APPEAL
Idaho Code § 12-117 provides as follows:
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative proceeding
or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or political
subdivision and a person, the state agency or political subdivision or the court, as
the case may be, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees,
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witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
Idaho Code § 12-117 (underline added). Peterson's appeal meets the requirements for this
section. With regard to the application of the expanded definition of estate to life estates,
Peterson has offered no authority and no reasonable argument that the life estate is not an asset of
the estate. Similarly, she has offered no theory of law or other authority to support her claim that
she should be given an offset for expenditures on her home without showing any increase in
value of the home. Finally, she continues to challenge the application of the Department's life
estate tables without offering any alternative method of valuation. Instead, she continues to
claim the life estate can have no value, which is part of the reason for her removal as personal
representative which was upheld on appeal. Peterson's appeal is without any reasonable basis in
fact or law and attorney fees should be awarded to the Department.

VIII.
CONCLUSION
Cathie Peterson received the real property she now occupies as a gift. The taxpayers,
through the Medicaid program, expended $171,386.94 in caring for the decedent after he gifted
his property to his daughter and before his death. The law provides that the life estate which the
decedent retained be used to offset, in a small measure, the amount expended for his care. This
is the third appeal Cathie Peterson has brought, together with more than four years of litigation in
an attempt to avoid this repayment. It is time the Department's rights to the life estate be finally
established so the Department can proceed in seeking a partition and ultimate payment.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS/PROCEDURAL WSTORY
In response to the Respondent's ("State;,) Brief and their Statement of Facts, Cathie

Peterson ("Cathie") will not recite all facts in this Reply Brief, but rather respond to the assertions
and misinfonnation contained in the Respondent's Brief.

Procedural]y, the State misrepresents the history of this matter and the legal affect of that
procedural history.

While it is true the Trial Court entered an Order on June 12, 2008, requiring payment of the
State's claim. That Order bears little or no relationship to the issues on this appeal The issue
raised in the States Petition for Payment of Claim was whether or not their claim was valid, not

whether or not Melvin's Estate has assets; and what those assets cousisted of, t.o satisfy the State's
claim.

Regardless, the State moved to compel the sale of Cathie's home on July 15, 2009, and after
heariug on July 28, 2009, the Trial Court then entered its Order Granting the Stat.e's Petition to
Compel Sale of Cathie's home on August 11, 2009. The August 11th decision by the Trial Court
was appealed resulting in this Court's Decision on Appeal dated May 25, 2010, vacating the Trial

Court's Order and remanding with instructions that the Trial Court make Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law before the legal issues could be properly addressed on appeal.
After much passage of time and a second appeal following the removal of Cathie as

Personal Representative, the Trial Court took evidence on September 29, 2011. as proffered by the
State. The State asserted they were asking the Trial Court for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law as directed by the District Court on remand from the frrst appeal. FoUowing th.e hearing and a
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briefing schedule, the Trial Court issued a Memorandum Decision on December 22, 2011, and an
Order Re: Value of Estate Interest on January 10, 2012 .

.Cathie timely appealed the Trial Court's Decision and Order. The State does not assert that
this appeal is untimely or improper, but mysteriously argues without explanation that this Court
should not hear Cathie's appeal as it somehow relates to the June 12. 2008, Order on Petition to
Require Payment of Claim. State's Brie( Additional Issues on Appeal, p.7.1

___
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The State at various times refers to this Order by different dates. It is assumed the State is
refening to the Order on Petition to Require Payment of Claim dated June 12, 2008.
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ARGUMENT

A.

Standard of Review

The State correctly recites the law in Idaho regarding Standard of Review when appealing
Findings of Fact, but avoids discussing the Standard of Review on appeal from the Trial Court's
Conclusions of Law or mixed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
"The review of a trial court's decision after a court trial is limited to ascertaining whether
the evidence supports the findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions
of law." Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout

ComP._anU~

143 Idaho 733, 735, 152 P.3d 604, 606

(2006).
"In reviewing a trial court's conclusions of law, however, a different standard applies: this
court is not bound by the legal conclusions of the trial court, but

may draw its own conclusions

:from the facts presented." Id; citing Idaho Forrest Industries, Inc. v. Hid<len Lake Watershed
Improvement District, 135 Idaho 316, 319, 17 P.3d 260, 263 (2000).
·'When reviewing mixed issues of law and fact, the Appellate Court reviews "freely" those
mixed issues of law and fact. Havelick v. Chobot, 123 Idaho 714, 717, 851 P.2d 1010, 1013

____

(App.1993).

...,,,---····•"'

B.

The Decision of the Magistrate.

Section ll of the State's Respondent's Brief badly misstates and misconstrues Cathie's
Appellant's Brief by spending several pages discussing the question of whether Cathie argues unfair
surprise. This issue was not raised by Cathie (intentionally or unintentionally) in the Appellant's
Brief. Rather, Appellanes Brief noted that on remand, no additional pleadings relevant to these
issues were filed from May 25, 2010, until the trial on September 29, 2011. At trial~ the State
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correctly represented to the Trial Court that it was seeking the entry of Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, as had fuiled to occur when entering the August 11, 2009, Order Granting
Petition to Compel.

The entirety of Section III of Respondent's Brief is moot where the State argues that Cathie
is appealing the Magistrate's June 12, 2008, Order. The State argues that that Order was final and
not subject to appeal, but fails to: a) Make a connection between the June 12, 2008, Order to
require payment of claim and the issues which are on appeal in this matter, which is the Trial
Court's Order Re: Value of Estate Interest dated January 10, 2012; and b) the State provides no
legal authority for its cont.ention that Cathie was required to appeal the June 12, 2008, Order

011

Petition to Require Payment of Claim in order for Cathie to now appeal the Magistrate's Order Re
Value of Estate Interest entered in January of this year.
.Perhaps, the confusion found in Respondent;s Brief is due to the State's misunderstanding
of probate law.
Idaho Code § 17-201 defines what judgments may be appealed from the Magistrate Court in
probate matters.
As this Court noted in its Decision on Appeal entered May 25, 2010:
On June 12, 2008, the Trial Court ent.ered an "Order on Petition to
Require Payment of Claim" granting the Department's Petition and
ordering that the life estat.e interest Mr. Pet.erson held in the real
property at the time of his death be deemed an asset of the estate for
the limited purpose of Medicaid estate recovery by the Department.
The Court also ordered that the Personal Representative pay the
Deparlment's claim to the extent ofavailable assets in the estate.
Decision on Appeal, p.2
(italics added)
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This District Court also held that the June 12, 2008, Order was interlocutory and not
appeala:ble as follows:

The trial court did not determine any value. not distribute, nor set
aside, nor partition the life estate in the Ordet itself. Accordingly, no
basis for appeal of the June 12, 2008, Order exists pursuant to Idaho
Code § 17-201(4)(5) and/or (7).
Therefore, that Order is
interlocutory, oot final, and thus not appealable.
Decision on Appeal, p.9
(italics added)
In short. the arguments contained in Respondent's Br:it( starting at page 9 and running
through the rop half of page 13 were previously asserted by the State and rejected by this District
Court in the first appeal. The State did not appeal this Court's Decision on Appeal in May, 2010.
This Court's Decision detenn:ining the June 12, 2008.

ro be an interlocutory and therefore not

appealable Order is the law of the case by which the State is bound.
C.

Melvin's Life Estate is Not An Estate Subject to Estate Reeo\tel'y Under Idaho
Cod~§ 56:-218(4).

Having disposed of the red herring issues raised~ again, by the State in the first several pages
of Respondent's Brief, we come again to the core issue on appeal, the reading of Idaho Code§ 56-

conclusion they desire rather than the conclusion found in Idaho law.

By the Respondenfs contention,, Idaho Code § 56-218(4) abrogated the common law
principles oflife estate, and determined that life estates are an asset of the est.ate and are valued at a
time prior to the decedent's death. As wm be shOVYll below, Idaho's stature does not support either
conclusion argued by Respondent.
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J.C. § 56-218(4)

First, subsection (a) acknowledges that assets of an estate should include all assets defined
by state probate law.

Idaho Code § 56-218(4)(a). As established in Appellant's Brief, that

provision adds nothing to the common law definition, and bolsters Appellant's position on this

appeal that a life estate is not to be included in the decedent's estate. The Smte does not challenge
Appellant's position, and relies entirely upon subsection (b).
Second, subsection (b) should be read carefully for what it actually says, rather than what
the State would like it to say:

I

"Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had

any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such interest) ....." This phrase, in and
of itself, adds nothing to the definition, since Idaho law and common law is a clear that a life estate

expires on death an4 therefore, decedent has no interest in a life estate at the time of death.
2.

The State relies entirely upon the latter half of subsection (b) which states

" ..•..including such assets oonveyed to a survivor, heir or assign of the deceased individual through
joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life est.at£, living trust or other aaangement." On
this part, the State grabbed onto the words ''life estate" assuming that the Court will paraphrase the
statute, like the State has, to conclude that said language modifies Idaho oommon law to include a

life estate in the decedent's estate at death. The statute simply does not say that.
When read in its entirety, subsection (b) permits the inclusion of any property held by the
decedent at the time of his death to the extent of the decedent's interest and also allows the ~1ate to
draw back into estate, assets which were conveyed by specific means, (i.e., joint tenancy, tenancy in
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common, survivorship, life est.ate, living trust or other arrangement) prior to death. However, here
Melvin never conveye.d a life est.ate. He retained one when he conveyoo fee simple title t.o Cathie.
The State persists in ignoring the plain reading ofldaho Code§ 56-218(4)(b). The statute,

as it plainly reads, requires the estate to include assets in which Melvin still retained a legal interest
and which may have been conveyed by joint tenancy. tenancy in common, sllf\1vorship. life estate
or living trust. None of these apply to the December, 2001, deed from Melvin to Cathie. Melvin
conveyed fee title to Cathie in 2001. He retained to himself a life estate. This is nowhere discussed
in I.C. § 56-218(4) despite the State's insistence otherwise.
For example, had Melvin conveyed fee ownership to Cathie in a joint tenancy, tenancy in
common, or by tenancy with right of survivorship reserving interest to himself, this would be an
assetto be included in Melvin's estate under subsection (b). This is true even if Melvin had
.included survivorship language, which :might normally result in title passing to co-tenants upon
Melvin's death.
However, nothing in the statute directs this Court to the State,s conclusion that the conunon

law principles of life estates were abrogated by I.C. § 56-218(4). The only logical explanation for
the State's argument is a conclusion that the State misunderstands the nature of real. estate law and
real estate conveyances.
The State argues an Oregon decision Department of Human Services v. Willingham, 136
P.3d 66 (2006) as if it resolves the question of interpreting Idaho Code§ 56-218(4)(b). The State

.even goes so far as to argue that the facts of the Oregon case are nearly identical. as those presented
in this matter, a brazen misstatement of the Willingham decision.
Oregon law and the facts in Willingham differ greatly :from the facts in this case as follows:
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The Oregon Court of Appeals noted that Willingham involved a lawsuit by the

Department against the son of a recipient of medical assistance. The state brought action under
Oregon statute and regulation~ which provides that the recipient of property is liable to the State for
the benefits claimed and to the extent of the decedent's interest in that property.
2.

In pertinent part the Oregon statute provides that "in an action or proceeding under

this section to recover medical assistance paid, it should be the legal burden of the person who

receives the property or other assets from a Medicaid recipient to establish the extent and value of
the Medicaid recipient's legal title or interest in the property or assets in accordance with rules
established by the Departrnenf'. ORS 411.620(4). No such similar provision exists in statutes of

Idaho.
3.

There are distinctions and differences in the language of the Oregon statute than that

found in Idaho Code§ 56-218(4). which are distinctions the State ignores in ,Respondent's Brief
while asserting to this Court it should adopt the reasoning of the Oregon Court of Appeals.
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should disregard R.espondenes citation to Oregon
law as binding this Court. Appellant asks this Court to review the Idaho statute on its face and

_

without regard to the Oregon Court of Appeals' Decision.
---··,.----·---·---· ...... ...... ,...

'

... .. _
,.

-

......... ·--

----·------

Additionally, Oregon's statutes specifically address life estates as an estate asset and how

they should be measured in the estate at the time of death, and such statutes were discussed by the
Oregon Court of Appeals in Willingham. 136 P.3d at 70.
Further, Oregon has an administrative regulation, which specifically addresses how cowts
are to include and value life estates held by the recipient of public assistance at the time of their
death and that they are to be. valued pursuant to the table set forth in the Oregon Administrative
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Rules irrespective of the actual lifespan of the measuring life. Willingham, 206 Or.App.156, 164-5,
136 P.3d 66, 70 (2006); citing OAR 461-135-0845.2
While the State in this matter argues the use of the asset transfer penalties found in Rule 837
as a valid means of valuing the life estate, they have no rule, such as Oregon, that directs the use of
such a table when valuing a life estate after the death of the recipient.
For the reasons set forth above, the Respondent's assertion that Oregon law is applicable is
unpersuasive and should be rejected.
D.

There is no Idaho Authority for Valuing a Life Estate "At the Moment Before
Death" in the Estate of the Decedent.

The State relies upon Iowa case law asserting that this Court and the Trial Court are
required to look at the value of Melvin's life estate at the moment before his death to assess its
value to the Estate for recovery purposes. The State does not cite this Court to a single precedential
case or statute in Idaho for this contention.
As with :the prior section, it appears the State re)jes upon Iowa Jaw resting upon case Jaw. in

other states, specifically Iowa, which rests upon Iowa statutoiy schemes different from Idaho's law.
Failing to reconcile this in any way, the State simply forges ahead with its fictional presumption

therefore, is not included in the decedent's estate under the probate provisions. Tobias v. State Tax
Commission, 85 Idaho 250, 255. 378 P.2d 628, __ (1963); 121 Am.Jur. Proof - Proof of Facts
3d, l 01 (2011 ); Idaho Code § 15-3-706 [inventory includes that owned by the decedent at the time
of his death).
2

This is particularly relevant to the second half of Appellant's argument wherein Cathie
challenges use of the Asset Transfer Penalty Table fowid in I.D.A.P.A. 16.03.05.837 also
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In Barkema. cited in Respondent's Brief, the Iowa Court construed the value at a point

immediately prior to death in detennining whether or not the deceased recipient's trust should be
distributed to the beneficiaries or to Medicaid Recovery. Obviously. Barkema js disti11guishable
since conveyances to trusts are specifically included in Idaho Code§ 56-218(4)(b) as an asset of the
estate.
The State also argues the Iowa case of Laughead, 696 NW 2d, 312 (Iowa, 2005). However,
again, Iowa law differs from Idaho's statutory scheme. As the court in Laughead noted, Iowa

legislation allows recovery against any interest held by the recipient at the time of death "to the
extent of such interest including, but not limited to, interest in jointly held property and interest in
trusts". Iowa Code§ 249A.5(2)(c)(1995).

Additionally. Iowa Code further makes such assets expressly subject to probate. The
Laughead court noted that as of 2002, the Iowa legislature modified the statute so as to expressly
''reach interests in real property 'including, but not limited to, interests in jointly held property.
retained life estates,

interest in trusts"'. In Re Estate ofLaygbead. 696 NW 2d, 312~ 315 (Iowa,

2005); quoting Iowa Code§ 249A.5(2)(c) as amended, effective April. 2002 [emphasis added].
Once again, the State persists in misrepresenting other jurisdiction's law to argue the
---------·--·-···-··-·--·-····------······· ·-----·--------

outcome they desire regardless of what Idaho statute says. The State cit.es to no precedent in Idaho
and the foreign jurisdictions cited and distinguishable with significantly different statutory
definitions than found in Idaho law.
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should vacate Judge Julian's Order Re Value of
Estate Interest as being erroneous as a matter of law.
referenced as Rule 837 in Appellant's Brief, p.10.
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The State Offers No Further Justification for Use of Rule 837, the Medicaid
Asset Transfer Penalty Tables.

Interestingly, the State makes no attempt to rebut Cathie's argument that the Asset Transfer
Penalty Tables are, by their plain tenns, intended as a means to assess asset transfer penalties upon
a Medicaid applicant, during his lifetime and during the "look back'' period. This is the exact
wording of Rule 837 and the State cannot deny the intended application of Rule 837. Despite this,
the State argues that this is the only measure that can "sensibly" be used and it is explicitly stated in

Respondent's Brief their assumption that the Court must apply the Rule 837 Tables to the life estate
at a point "several moments" before Melvin's death. To do otherwise, renders the State's argument

ridiculous.
As indicated~ the State had to convince the Trial Court and now has to convince this Court

on appeal to value Melvin's life estate prior to his death because to do otherwise flies in the face of
Idaho law. The value of a life estate is detennined by taking into account the age and life

expectancy of the life tenant See West v Tax Cmmnission, 99 Idaho 21). 27, 576 P.2d 106~ 1061
(1978).

Clearly, valuing Melvin's life estate after his death is impossible since th.ere is no life
·-·-"expectancY''.afterliiSdeatli.----· --· .................... ·· ·
Indeed, logic flies in the face of the State's position in this matter. The value of a life estate
is measured by what a lmowledg~le buyer would pay factoring in the value of occupancy and use
of the real property during the life expectancy of the measuring life. Once Melvin died, the
valuation measures ceased to exist.
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Additionally, the State has the audacity to argue that Cathie has offered no alternative basis
for valuing the life estate other than the Rule 837 Table. This is a blatant misrepresentation of the
record. The record will reflect that on August 6, 2008, Cathie filed a Motion to Hire Appraiser, and
the State objected five (5) days later on August 11t1i. In the end, the Trial Court agreed with the
State allowing Cathie to only engage an appraiser for the purpose of valuing fee ownership in the
property, not a value of the life estate. To now assert that Cathie failed to offer an alternative is at
best a disingenuous argument by the State. The State set out at the outset of this Estate in 2007 to
dictate the manner in which Melv.in's life estate would be handled and valued using only Rule 837.
As this Court is well aware, life estates are frequently valued by appraisers and actuarial experts,

but Cathie and the Estate were deprived of that opportunity by the Trial Court and by Respondent.
For the reasons set forth above, the use of Rule 837 was an erroneous valuation by the Trial
Court and constitut.es reversible error. This Court should reverse and remand with instructions to

value Melvin's life estate at the time of his death through the use of an appropriate, qualified expert.
F.

.Jnrisdietion

On this subject, the State really raises no case law or argument that it has, through service of
.process, correctly engaged the jurisdiction of the Court over Cathie Peterson, individually. The
State seems to argue in ad na.useum that because Cathie is Melvin,s daughter that she is somehow
"not a stranger" and, therefore, should be deemed a party to the litigation. This overlooks the basic
principles of jurisdiction and due process cited in Appellant's Brief. The State argues that because
Cathie offered evidence at hearing that she somehow submitted to the Court's jurisdiction and that
due process, service of process and other jurisdictional niceties can be overlooked. Cathie Peterson,
individually, never appeared voluntarily before the Court. Rather, the undersigned filed a Special
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Appearance reserving jurisdictional issues on behalf of Cathie Peterson. individually, and did so

only after the State made it clear that it intended to take Cathie's home from her in order to satisfy
their Medicaid claim against Melvin.
The State was forewarned of the jurisdiction issues on the first appeal to this Court, when
the Court stated: "...... the Trial Court must have concluded that it had jurisdiction over real
property, which is vested in a person who is not a party to the proceeding ....." Decision on
Appeal. ·p.10.

"A judgment entered without meeting the jurisdictional requirements of service of process
or due process deprives the court ofjurisdiction over the person and is void." McGloon v. Gwynn.

140 Idaho 727, 729, 100 P.3d 621, 623 (2004).
Lastly, the State argues on page 21 in Section V that the hearing in September, 2011, was

for Cathie,s benefit. This js so perplexing as to be absurd. This Court on appeal previously
reversed and remanded with instructions to the Trial Court that it make appropriate Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law. The Trial Court in response thereto set the matter for 1rial September 29,
2011, and the State, as the moving party, presented evidence and sought the Court's entry of an

Order Re Value of Estate. Nothing about this procedure was for the benefit of Cathie. It was,
------····

"'"-·-·--·

>

>

.... ,.

'

~~

.......

'"'

~

......

'

however, for the benefit of following the law and lawful procedure that this Court reversed and
remanded in May. 2010, with instructions to take evidence and make appropriate Findings of Fact

and Conclusions ofLaw.
The State proffers nothing to this Court which would give evidence of its jurisdiction over

Cathie Peterson; individually. The Court should bear in mind that Cathie had an lllltenable choice
after the State caused her to be removed as Personal Representative: either decline to participate
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further and thereby risk losing her home. or participate reserving jurisdictional issues. Cathie chose
the latter, but did so specifically reserving those jurisdictional issues. The State's arguments to the

contrary are simply ·unavailing.

G.

The Trial Court Failed to Grant Cathie Appropriate Credit for Improvements
to Her Home.

Without citing any case law, the State argues that the Trial Court correctly deprived Cathie
of several thousand dollars in documented improvements t.o the property. The Trial Court in its
MeII10randum Decision likewise failed to support that finding with any law. The Appellant's Brief
filed by Cathie in this matter has set forth the legal basis fur her recovey, and this Court is asked to
reverse and remand with instructions to give Cathie credit for the documented improvements made
to her property should this Court affnm the Trial Court's Order Re Value of Estate as it regards the
inclusion ofthe life estate and its valuation under Rule 837.

H.

Attorneys' Fees on Appeal

The State argues under Idaho Code§ 12-117 that it is entitled to attorneys' fees. It is clear

that this matter is a case of first impression. as neither the State nor Cathie has cited the Court to

any Idaho case law on the matters set forth in this appeal In matters of first impression, neither
··--pfil1;Y is entitled to att0meys' fees. It is clear that this matter is a case of fi:rst impression. as neither
the State nor Cathie has cited the Court to an.y Idaho case law on the matters set forth in this appeal.

In matters of first impression, neither party is entitled to attorneys' fees. Trunnell v. Fergel, 153
-·-·-- ·--Idaho 68; 278;· P.3d--9.38 (2012),. -However,. given the absurd and nonsensical arguments_of the_
State, Appellant seeks attorneys' fees on the basis that Respondent has acted :frivolously and
unreasonably.
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For these reasons, this Court should not award attorneys' fees and costs to the Respondent
on appeal.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should reverse the Trial Court's Memorandum

Decision and Order Re Value of Estate.
DATED this _ _ day of July, 2012.

FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM1 CHTD.

- - ___ ..... ·--······ ·-..--····

.•.....

-· ··-··-··-·-······ ........ ·- ·-·············· -·-··· ..... ···-··

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF· 19

·-··--···· ·- -· ...

T-016 P0022/0022 F-126

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of July, 2014 I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following manner:

John A. Finney, Esq.
FINNEY, FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A.
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint, ID 83864
W. Cory Cartwright. Esq.
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
Human Services Division
3276 Elder, Suite B
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0036
Hon, Steve Verby
District Court Judge
1500 Highway 2
Sandpoint. ID 83864

[ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Hand delivered
[~ Facsimile No. (208) 263-8211
[ ] Other: _ _ _ _ __

[ 1 U.S. Mail; Postage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Hand delivered

C)[

[J

[ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Hand delivered
~ Facsimile No. (208) 263-0896

ft j

---

__

.... ·----·

..... -.. ···---···- ··-· -·· . -- ......... ___ ..... ·······--·-·-·· ...... .

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF· 20.

Facsimile No. (208) J~4-651~ _
Other:
·

Other:~~----

NOV. 16. 2012 11 : 57AM

NO. 2093

P. 1110

ORIGINAL

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

)

CASE NO. CV07-00266

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF )
)

MELVIN PETERSON,

)
)

Deceased.

)
)

OPINION AND ORDER ON
APPEAL OF MAGISTRATE
COURT'S RULING RE
MEDICAID CLAIM

This matter is before the Court on appeal of the magistrate court's ruling regarding the
value of the deceased's remainder interest upon tennination of his life estate for purposes of
Medicaid reimbursement. The Court heard oral arguments on the appeal on October 12, 2012.
Respondent Department of Health and Welfare (4'Department") was represented by attorney W.
Corey Cartwright from the State of Idaho Attorney General's office. Appellant Cathie Peterson,
daughter of Melvin Peterson, was represented by Brent C. Featherston, The Court, having read
the Memorandum Opinion and Order Re: Value of Estate Interest entered by the magistrate court
and the briefs filed by the parties, having heard oral arguments of counsel, and being fully
advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision.
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FACTUALANDPRO~EDURALBACKGROUND

The magistrate court found the following facts to be undisputed. 1 Melvin Peterson
("Melvin") was born on

and died at the age of 83 on March 3, 2007. Prior to his

death, Melvin was the o'Wll.er ofresidential real property located in Boundary County. On
December 6t 2001, Melvin executed a Gift Deed of his real property to his daughter, Cathie
Peterson, retaining for himself a life estate in the property. 2 Shortly thereafter~ Melvin applied
for Medicaid and began receiving Medicaid benefits in March 2003. At the time of his death,
Melvin had received a total of $171,386.94 in Medicaid benefits.
Cathie Peterson ("Cathie") was named Personal Representative of Melvin's estate in July
2007. On August 6, 2007, Cathie sent a notice to creditors to the Department of Health &
Welfare ("Department") but, when the Department filed a claim for $171,386.94 against the
estate in the probate action, Cathie denied the claim without reason. The Department filed an

Amended Claim against the estate along with a Petition for Allowance of Amended Claim.
Cathie again denied the claim without reason and filed an objection to the Petition for Allowance
of Amended Claim. On March 25, 2008, a hearing was held on the Departmenfs Petition. after
which the Court entered an Order granting the Petition for Allowance of Amended Claim.
On May 5, 2008, the Department filed a Petition to Require Payment of Claim along with

a supporting brief setting forth the Department's demand for payment of the value of the life
estate pursuant to I.C. § 56-218(4)(b). On May 28, 2008, Cathie filed a Personal
Representative's Inventocy and objection to the Department's Petition. Following a June 12,
2008 hearing, the magistrate court entered an Order establishing the life estate remainder interest
as an asset of the estate for purposes of Medicaid recoyery, and ordering Cathie to amend the

1

Memorandum Opinion of Magistrate Judge Justin Julian tiled on December 22, 2011.
not dispute that she paid no monetary consideration for the pro~rty.

2 Cathie Peterson does
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Inventory to assign an appropriate value to the life estate, However, Cathie instead filed and was
granted a motion to hire an appraiser to determine the fee simple value of the residential real
3

property. When no appraisal was ever filed by Cathie, the Department filed various motions
relative to appraisal, sale of the property and payment of the Department's claim.4 On August
11, 2009, the magistrate court granted the Department's motions to compel appraisal, sale of the
property and payment of the Medicaid claim. Cathie subsequently appealed the grant of the
motions.
On appeal: the District Court vacated the magistrate's Order and remanded the matter

back to establish findings of facts and conclusions of law. 5 Shortly after the ruling on appeal was
entered, Cathie sought permission from the magistrate court to sell the property, liquidate an
escrow account, and to pay counsel for the personal representative of the estate (Cathie), 6 On the
same day, Cathie filed an Amended Personal Representative's Inventory assigning the life estate
zero value.
On September 17, 2010, attorney Brent Featherston filed a Demand for Notice and
Special Appearance) stating he represented Cathie in her personal capacity and that he was
seeking to vacate and dismiss all orders entered by the magistrate court regarding "Cathie's'' real
property. 7 Cathie, in her capacity as personal representative of her father's estate, remained
represented by attorney John Finney. The Department responded by filing a Petition to remove
3

Order entered September 23, 2008.
Compel Short Fonn Appraisal filed May 14, 2009; Petition to Compel Sale of Home and Payment to
Department and Notice of Filing Appraisal Report and Addendum flied July 15, 2009.
5
Decision on Appeal entered May 25, 2010.
6
Filed June 22, 2010.
7
On appeal. Cathie argues she was never joined individually in the above-entitled action even though she became
the owner of the home upon the termination of the life estate. However, Cathie cites the Court to no authority that
supports her theory that she should have been joined individually. After Cathie was removed as personal
representative of the Estate, the lower court allowed Cathie to fully participate in the proceedings, to be represented
in her individual capacity by counsei and to be heard in her individual capacity. Of primary importance on appeal
is the fact Cathie never raised the issue of non-joiner before the lower court and, because the issue was never raised,
it was never decided by the lower court. Therefore, the issue is not ripe for appeal.
4 Motion to
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Cathie as personal representative of the estate. Following a hearing on all pending matters, the
magistrate court entered an Order removing Cathie as personal representative of her father's
estate. The Order was appealed but was subsequently affirmed by the District Court on May 11,
2011. A court trial was then held on September 29t 2011. On December 22, 2011, the
magistrate court entered its Memorandwn Opinion and on January 10, 2012 entered an Order Re:

Value of Estate Interest. In its Opinion, the lower court held the life estate remainder interest
was an estate asset of value for purposes of Medicaid reimbursement and that its value was to be
determined in compliance with IDAPA 16.03.05.837.01 (aka Rule 837). The lower court's
Memorandum Opinion is now before this Court on appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Statutory interpretation is a question oflaw over which appellate courts exercise free
review. Dyet v. McKinley, 139 Idaho 526, 529, 81 P.3d 1236~ 1239 (2003).
The objective of statutory intexpretation is to derive the intent of the legislative
body that adopted the act. Statutory intexpreta.tion begins with the literal language
of the statute. Provisions should not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted in
the context of the entire document The statute should be considered as a whole,
and words should be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be
noted that the Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute
so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant When the statutory language
is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given
effect, and the Court need not consider rules of statutory construction.

State v. Schulz, 151Idaho863, 866, 264 P.3d 970, 973 (2011).
It is well established that where statutory language is unambiguous, legislative
history and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of
altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature. Id Only where a statute is
capable of more than one conflicting construction is it said to be ambiguous and
invoke the rules of statutory construction. L & W Supply Corp. v. Chartrand
Family Trust, 136 Idaho 738, 743, 40 P.3d 96, 101 (2002). Ifit is necessary for
this Court to interpret a statute because an ambiguity exists, then this Court will
attempt to ascertain legislative intent and, in construing the statute, may examine
the language used, the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, and the
policy behind the statute. Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Ins. Fund, 134 Idaho 130,
In the Matter cfthe Estate ofPetersen
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134, 997 P.2d 591, 595 (2000). Where the language of a statute is ambiguous
constructions that lead to absurd or unreasonably harsh results are disfavored: See
Jasso v. Camas Cnty., 151Idaho790, 798, 264 P.3d 897, 905 (2011).

Peck v. Idaho Dept. of Transportation, 153 Idaho 37, 46, 278 R.3d 439, 448 (Ct.App.2012).
ANALYSIS
At issue in the instant matter is whether the magistrate court erred when it ruled a life
estate remainder interest must be assigned value by an estate for purposes of Medicaid recovery.s
The issue has not been addressed by Idaho's Supreme Court or Court of Appeals. The issue has
been addressed in part by a magistrate judge in the Second Judicial District. 9 In the instant
matter, the magistrate judge stated in his Memorandum Opinion that he found the reasoning,
rationale and conclusions of the Second Judicial District magistrate persuasive and correct and,
therefore, incorporated the magistrate's opinion by reference. On appeal, this Court also finds
the reasoning and analysis of the Second Judicial District magistrate judge persuasive and
correct In addition, the Court finds the analysis of the Idaho Supreme Court in Idaho Dept. of

Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785 (2012) applicable to the instant matter.
In her argument asserting the lower court erred, Cathy relies on common law principles
to support her position that the life estate has no value. Under the common law~ at the death of
one holding a life estate, the life estate ceases to exist and therefore has no value. While the
common law espoused by Cathie is correct, her position fails to recognize that it is within the
lawful power of the legislature to modify common law. Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical

Center, 134 Idaho 464, 4 PJd 1115 (2000).
8

The State asserts on appeal that Cathie may not appeal the issue of whether the life estate remainder interest in the
home is an asset that must be inventoried and given value in the Estate for purposes of Medicaid reimbursement, as
the issue is res judicata having been decided in a prior appeal in this matter. This Court does not find the issue res
judicata. The lower court stated in i~ December 22, 2011 Memorandum Opinion, which is the subject of this
appeal, that the primary issue before it was "whether the gifted life estate remainder interest can be included as an
estate asset for the limited purpose of satisfying the State's Wipaid Medicaid lien, pursuant to Idaho Code Section
56"218(4). Clearly the lower cowt did not find the issue had been decided in the prior appeal.
9
See Jn the Estate c/Grorhe, Nez Perce County Case No. CV02-02163, Magistrate Judge Jay Gaskill presiding.
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Under Idaho's Public Assistance statutes, the provision for recovery of Medicaid
benefits is found at LC.§ 56-218 and reads in pertinent part:
For purposes of this section, the tenn "estate" shall include:
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual
had any legal title or interest at the time of death, to the extent of such interest,
including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased
individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate,
living trust or other arrangement.
I.C. § 56-218(4).
In order to address the definition of"estate", as established by the legislature in I.C. § 56-

218(4), it is necessary to look at the purpose behind the Medicaid program, and the recovery
provisions under both federal and state law.
The Medicaid program is a "cooperative endeavor [with the states] in which the
Federal Government provides financial assistance to participating States to aid
them in furnishing health care to needy persons." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,
308, 100 S.Ct 2671, 2683, 65 L.Bd2d 784, 799 (1980). Participating states enact
legislation and rules, incorporate them into state medical assistance plans, and
submit those plans to the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) for
approval. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)-(b). Upon approval, the states receive federal
payments for the program. 42 U.S.C. § 1396. As one of the many conditions for
receipt of federal Medicaid funds, federal law specifically regulates when and to
what extent st.ates may recover for payments made to individuals. 42 U.S.C. §
1396p.

Idaho Department ofHealth & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785 (2012).
As was clearly noted by Idaho's Supreme Court in McCormick,
Medicaid has always been intended to be ''the payer of last resort." Arkansas
Dep't ofHealth and Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 541U.S.268, 291, 126 S.Ct. 1752,
1767} 164 L.Ed.2d 459, 478 (2006) (quoting S.Rep. No. 99-146, at 313 (1985)).
Accordingly, excess resources saved by virtue of Medicaid funds are meant to be
tracked and recovered. See Cohen v. Comm'r ofDiv. ofMed Assistance, 423
Mass. 399, 668 N.E.2d 769, 772 (1996) (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 265, at 72 (1985));
H.R.Rep. No. 105(!!), at 73 (1987) ("Medicaid-an entitlement program for the
poor-should not facilitate the transfer of accumulated wealth from nursing home
patients to their non-dependent children.'').
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Idaho Department of Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785 (2012).

Idaho's Supreme Court has recognized that the legislative purpose behind the Medicaid
recovery statutes is to prevent individuals from transfening their assets to survivors, heirs, or
assign, while at the same time benefiting from taxpayer funds intended to assist the poor. 10
Looking to the overall purpose of the recovery statutest Idaho's Supreme Court quoted the North
Dakota Supreme Court inln re Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882, 885 (N.D.2000), which stated:
We conclude consideration of all the relevant statutory provisions, in light of the
Congressional purpose to provide medical care for the needy, reveals a legislative
intention to allow states to trace the assets ofrecipients of medical assistance and
recover the benefits paid when the recipient's surviving spouse dies.
We hold any assets conveyed by [the recipient] to [the recipient's spouse] before
[the recipient's] death and traceable to [the recipient's] estate are subject to the
department's recovery claim. However, the recoverable assets do not include all
property ever held by either party during the marriage. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)
contemplates only that assets in which the deceased recipient once held an interest
will be traced. It does not provide that separately~owned assets in the survivor's
estate, or assets in which the deceased recipient never held an interest, are subject
to the department's claim for recovery.

607 N.W.2d at 886 (emphasis original) (citations omitted).

Idaho Department ofHealth & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785 (2012),
The reasoning of the Idaho Supreme Court in McCormick regarding the right to recover
Medicaid benefits from assets once held by a Medicaid recipient is equally applicable when a
recipient conveys real property to an heir, such as a non-dependent child, while retaining a life
estate interest. Idaho Code§ 56-218(4), which adopts nearly word for word the language found
in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l), defines "estate" for purposes of Medicaid reco-very as any real

property in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death, to include
This purpose was also recognized by magistrate Judge 1ay Gaskill in his opinion in In the Estate ofGrothe, Nez
Perce County Case No. CV02-2163, April 22, 2008: "Medicaid is intended to act as a safety net, nm a free ride.
Medicaid is not an avenue by which one can shift his or her financial burden for medical care to the American
taxpayer, while a recipient's heirS enjoy a fmancia.l windfall."
10
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assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign through joint tenancy, tenancy in common,
survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement, a clear catch-all phrase. Contrary to
the arguments of Cathie, "estate'\ as defined in J.C.§ 56-218(4), includes property conveyed
during the Medicaid recipient's lifetime as well as conveyances that occur at the time of death,
i.e. the conveyance of a remainder interest upon the death of the holder of a retained life estate as
in the instant matter. Idaho Department ofHealth & Welfate v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785
(2012).
Idaho's Supreme Court has clearly interpreted Idaho's recovery statute as allowing the
Department to look to "resources in which the recipient had an interest at one time but disposed
of through her own actions or those of her spouse - such as a lifetime transfer of a home. 1' Id. In
the instant matter, the real property owned by Melvin Peterson, which he disposed of through his
own actions, is exactly the type of property conveyance Idaho's Supreme Court has held subject
to Medicaid recovery. The conveyance executed by Melvin Peterson falls squarely within the
catch-all phrase "or other arrangement" used by Idaho's legislature in l.C. § 56-218(4)(b).
Melvin Peterson conveyed, free of any cost, a remainder interest of his residential real property
to

his daughter Cathie, retaining a life estate interest for himself, and did so well within the

applicable look-back period provided for in IDAPA 16.03.05.286. The magistrate judge

correctly found the transfer of the remainder interest11 subject to Idaho's Medicaid recovery

11

The parties consistently referred to the life estate as the property interest to be valued. The lower court refe1Ted to
the property interest to be valued as the life estate remainder interest. The correct interest to value for Medicaid
recovery purposes is the property interest that was conveyed for less than fair market value, not the property interest
retained. It is clear the magistrate court in the instant matter understood the property interest to be valued, as
evidence by his Order that reads, "The value of the estate's interest in the real property gift deeded to Cathie
Peterson ... shall be that prop0rtion of the fair market value of the entire fee interest in the real property ...."
Order Re: Value of Estate Interest filed January 10, 2012. This distinction was not made in the Second District case
of Grothe, as the issue in Grothe was whether the Department could pllt'$ue its Medicaid recovery claim in the
probate proceeding where its claim was against a non-probate property interest. In Grorhe, both parties looked to
the life estate interest as the subject of the Medicaid recovery claim and, therefore, did not raise for the court's
determination the issue of which property interest was properly subject to the Medicaid recovery claim.
In the Matter ofthe Estate ofPeterson
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statute and that the value of the remainder interest is to be determined pursuant to IDAPA
16.03.05.857.01 for purposes of the Department's Medicaid recovery claim.

Finally, the Court finds the magistrat.e court did not error in finding Cathie presented

insufficient evidence to support her claim for unjust enrichment based on improvements she
made to the real property at issue. The lower court correctly found the measure of damages is
the difference between the fair market value of the real property before the improvements and
the fair market value of the property after the improvements, not the cost of materials and labor
expended for the improvements. See Gillette v. Storm Circle Ranch, 101 Idaho 663, 619 P.2d
1116 (1980) and Nielson v. Davis, 96 Idaho 314, 528 P.2d 196 (1974). Cathie presented no

evidence on the property's fair market value before and after improvements.
The last issue to be addressed is the Department's request for attorney fees on appeal.
The Court is unable to find Cathie acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. The issue
appealed by Cathie has yet to be addressed by Idaho's Supreme Court or Court of Appeals and,
therefore, the Court cannot characterize Cathie's appeal as unreasonable.

ORDER
The Memorandum Opinion and Order Re: Value of Estate Interest entered by the

magistrate court is hereby AFFIRMED.
The Department's request for an award of attorney fees on appeal is hereby DENIED.
Dated this
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing OPINION AND ORDER was:

/

hand delivered via court baske~ or

-={;4.l{J.

.,/

_ _ mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this
November, 2012, to:
Brent Featherston
FAX: (208) 263-0400
W. Cory Cartwright
FAX: (208) 334-6515
Boundary County District Court
FAX: (208)267-7814
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
In the Matter of the Estate of
MELVIN PETERSON,
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2007-00266
NOTICE OF APPEAL

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-)
TO:

THE RESPONDENT IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE,
AND THE RESPONDENT'S ATTORNEY, W. COREY CARTWRIGHT,
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVEENTITLED COURT

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT Cathie Peterson, individually, herein
APPELLANT, appeals pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83 and Idaho Code§ 17-201, as follows:
I.

The above-named Appellant, Cathie Peterson, individually, appeals against the

above-named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Opinion and Order on
Appeal of Magistrate Court's Ruling Re Medicaid Claim ("Opinion") entered in the aboveentitled action on the 161h day of November, 2012, Honorable District Judge Jeff M. Brodie,
presiding, and the Order Re: Value of Estate Interest, entered January 10, 2012, by Magistrate
Justin Julian.
2.
~ J:.aw !ffnn cr.L
'Daniel'P. ![ellt/ier;tl)n

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant

'.Brent c. ![ellt/ier;tl)n*

Jert:lll!J 'P. !feat/ier;tl)n

Jemni .£. OSSllUUI
:1.13 s. s"""11 Ave.
SRrufpomt, Jtfolio 8.3864
(208) 26.3-6866
:Fa;c(208)26.3-0400

*£kensdin
lifolio <17' 'Wtulii"tltim

to Rule 1 l(a)(2) and (b), 1.A.R.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1

3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellant then

intends to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the
Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal.
(a)

Did the Court err in determining that Melvin's Life Estate is an asset

subject to estate recovery under Idaho Code§ 56-218(4)?
(b)

Did the Court err in determining that Idaho law requires valuing a Life

Estate "at the moment before death" as an asset of the decedent's estate?
(c)

Did the Court err in determining that Idaho Code § 56-218 applies to

life estates for Medicaid recovery purposes?
(d)

Did the Court err in determining that Rule 837 is applicable in valuing a

life estate at the time of the holder's death?
(e)

Did the Court err in determining that this Court has subject matter

jurisdiction to determine the issues before it?

(f)

Did the Court err in determining that the Court has personal jurisdiction

over Cathie Peterson?
(g)

Did the Court err in determining that Cathie Peterson was not entitled

to recoup her investment improving the property after taking title to the property from Melvin
Peterson?

~Law"""' do{
'1JanidP. 7eatlierstxm
'lJrent C. !feat/ierston•
Jert111fj 'P. !feat/ierstxm
Jeremi .£.Ossman

Has an order been entered sealing or any portion of the record?

5.

(a)

Is a reporter's transcript requested?

(b)

The Appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the

reporter's transcript: Oral argument on October 12, 2012.

.P1ttom1!fS at Uw1
113 s. Secons(Jllfle.
Santfpoint~

Itfflfio 83864

(208) 263-6866

7"'((208)263-0400

• £ice.nseJ/ in

Itfa/W & 'Wo:sli.i"BfOr>

No.

4.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2

Yes.

6.

The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Clerk's

Record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, l.A.R.:

All exhibits

admitted at hearing on September 29, 2011.
7.

I certify:
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the court reporter.
(b) (1) That the Clerk of the District Court will be paid the estimated fee for

the preparation of the reporter's transcript upon receipt of such estimate from the Court
Reporter.
(c) (1) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been
paid or will be paid upon receipt of such estimate.
(d) ( 1) That the appellate filing fee has been paid.
(e) (1) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20.
DATED thisUt'afDecember, 2012.

BRENT C. FEATHERSTON
Attorney for Appellant Cathie Peterson

'}'d{rmtm J:aw f{fnn dli'.
'1Jll1lie{P. !featfierston
!Brent !feat/ierst;m*
Jeremy P. !feat/ierst;m
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(208) 263-666G
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II
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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I hereby certify that on the
of December, 2012, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following
manner:

John A. Finney, Esq.
FINNEY, FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A.
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint, ID 83864

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
't>CJ

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand delivered
Facsimile No. (208) 263-8211

[ ] Other: - - - - - - - -

W. Cory Cartwright, Esq.
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
Human Services Division
3276 Elder, Suite B
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0036
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Jeremy P. !feat/ierswn
Jemni £. Ossman.
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Sarufpoint, ItfaM 8.3864
(208) 263-6866
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U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight
Mail
[ ]
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[ ] Other: ~-------

~

D

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
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S. KAY CHRISTENSEN, ISB No. 3101
CHIEF, CONTRACTS AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DIVISION
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STATE OF IOAHO
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W. COREY CARTWRIGHT
Deputy Attorney General
3276 Elder, Ste. B
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83 720-0009
Telephone: (208) 332-7961
Facsimile: (208) 334-6515
ISB No. 3361
cartwriw@dhw.idaho.gov
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
In the Matter of the Estate Of:

)
)

MELVIN PETERSON,

)

Deceased.

)
)

Supreme Court Docket No. 40615-2013
Washington County Case No.
CV-2007-00266
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
RECORD

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED PETITIONER-APPELLANT AND THE PARTY'S
ATTORNEY, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT:
I

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the Respondent in the above entitled proceeding hereby
requests pursuant to Rule 19, I.A.R., the inclusion of the following material in the clerk's record
in addition to that required to be included by the I.A.R. and the notice of appeal.
Additional clerk's record requested:
1.
0712612007 Application for Informal Probate and Appointment of a Personal
Rep
2.
0712612007
Statement of Informal Probate and Appointment of a Personal
Representative
3.
0712612007 Letters of Personal Representative
REQUEST FOR
ADDITIONAL RECORD - 1Y:\MRCases\Estate\WCC\wee Open Cases\PetersonMelvin\Supreme Court\Request for Additional Record. wpd

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

11/19/2007
11119/2007
11/30/2007
12/10/2007
12/10/2007
12/13/2007
12/28/2007
04/04/2008
0510512008
0510512008
05/28/2008
06/12/2008
0711512009
07/15/2009
07115/2009
08/1112009
0911412009
0911412009
11/13/2009
12/14/2009
12/23/2009
05/26/2010
06/23/2010
06/30/2010
09/22/2010
09/22/2010
10/07/2010
11122/2010
01124/2011
02/25/2011
07/26/2011

35.
36.

07/26/2011
09/29/2011

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

11107/2011
11118/2011
12/05/2011
12/22/2011
01/10/2012
03/15/2012
05/3112012

Demand for Notice
Claim Against Estate
Disallowance of Creditor's Claim and Request for Itemization
Amended Claim Against Estate
Petition for Allowance of Claim
Notice of Disallowance of Amended Claim Against Estate
Petition for Allowance of Amended Claim
Order Granting Petition for Allowance of Amended Claim
Petition to Require Payment of Claim
Brief in Support of Petition to Require Payment of Claim
Personal Representative's Inventory
Order on Petition to Require Payment of Claim
Notice of Filing Appraisal Report and Addendum
Petition to Compel Sale of Home and Payment to Department
Brief in Support of Petition
Order Granting Petition to Compel
Transcript Filed (7/28/09)
Transcript Filed (6/3/08)
Appellant's Brief
Respondent's Brief
Appellant's Reply Brief
Decision on Appeal
Amended Personal Representative's Inventory
Petition for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Petition for Removal of Personal Representative for Cause
Memorandum in Support of Petition for Removal
Order Removing Personal Representative
Transcript Filed (10/7/10 Petition & Motion)
Appellant's Brief
Respondent's Brief
Hearing result for Scheduling and Planning scheduled on
07/26/2011
Court Minutes Hearing type
Personal Representative's Requested Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law
Closing Brief (Cartwright)
Cathy Peterson's Responsive Brief (Featherston)
Reply Brief (Cartwright)
Memorandum Opinion
Order re Value of Estate Interest
Transcript Filed
Appellant's Brief

REQUEST FOR
ADD ITI0 NAL RECORD - 2Y:\MRCases\Estate\WCCIWCC Open Cases\PetersonMelvin\Supreme Court\Request for Additional Record. wpd

44.
45.

0612112012
0712012012

Respondent's Brief
Appellant's Reply Brief

I certify that this request for additional record has been served upon the clerk of the
district court and upon the following parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20.
Cathie Peterson,
CIO Brent C. Featherston, Attorney at Law, 113 South Second Avenue,
Sandpoint, ID 83864
DATED this 9th day of January, 2013.

~~

Deputy Attorney General
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TO: Clerk of the Court
Idaho Supreme Court
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0101
Fax (208) 334-2616
sctfilings@idcourts.net
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STATE OF IOAHO
COUNTY OF BQUHOAERRYK
GLENDA~·
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BY Of.PUT YCLERK

RE: Docket No. 40615-13
Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare V Peterson
Boundary County District Court No. CV 07-266

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED

Notice is hereby given that on February 27, 2013, I lodged a transcript of 52 pages in
length for the above-referenced appeal with the District Court Clerk of the County of
Boundary in the First Judicial District of the State ofldaho.
Included Hearings:

Motion Hearing October 12, 2012

An electronic copy was sent to the Supreme Court at sctfilings@idcourts.net.
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CATHIE PETERSON,
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I, Della A Armstrong, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District,
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Boundary, do hereby certify:
That the attached Exhibit List contains the exhibits which were offered or admitted
into evidence during the trial in this cause.
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Pet Ex A: 9-29-11 Court Trial Copy Gift Deed, Peterson to
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Court File
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Pet Ex B: 9-29-11 Court Trial Copy IDAPA Rules & Tables, 3
pp.
Resp Ex 1: 9-29-11 Court Trial Manilla envelope containing 20
receipts for work, repair on
residence
Resp Ex 2: 9-29-11 Court Trial Copy of Warrant Deed, Strand to
Peterson and Whitman, one page
Resp Ex 3: 9-29-11 Court Trial Copy of Judgment, Peterson v.
Whitman, CV 02-415, s pp.
Resp Ex 4: 9-29-11 Court Trial Copy of Quitclaim Deed from
Whitman to Peterson, 1 pg
Resp Ex 5: 9-29-11 Court Trial Copy of Letter, with attachments,
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4-24-07, 8 pp.
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)

I, Della A. Armstrong, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District,
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Boundary, do hereby certify that the above
and foregoing Record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my
direction and is a true, full and correct Record of the pleadings and documents under Rule
28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
I do further certify that, in addition to the exhibits identified in the Reporter's
Transcript, the following will be submitted as exhibits to this Record on Appeal:
1. Transcript of hearing held on June 3rd, 2008 on the Petition to Require Payment
of Claim, filed on September 14th, 2009.
2. Transcript of hearing held on July 28th, 2009 on the Petition to Compel filed on
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